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In this thesis, we set out to explore some of the issues that arise when we elicit the societal 
value of life and health.  Many governments use societal preferences to inform their policy and 
budget allocation decisions. However, there is plenty of evidence contesting the reliability and 
validity of the elicited preference estimates. A possible driver for this may be the fact that the 
economic theory underlying elicitation methods and value metrics lacks descriptive validity. 
First, expected utility theory (EUT) may not provide a valid description of people’s behaviour 
under risk. Second, the account that people exclusively care about maximising their own utility, 
disregarding that of others, may not be accurate. Using the wrong value estimates could lead to 
sub-optimally allocating enormous amounts of money, with the consequent loss of welfare; 
hence the relevance of this research.  
The first part of this thesis focuses around violations of EUT, in particular the reduction of 
compound lotteries axiom (RCLA) and the independence axiom. In Chapter 2, the disparities 
between the utility estimates elicited directly and indirectly using the standard gamble method 
are studied. They could be caused by a failure of the RCLA, but also by the context in which the 
estimates were elicited. We found that after having removed the effect of affect and the lack of 
incentives, and when choice complexity was the lowest, the disparities, and hence the violation 
of the RCLA, persisted. This suggests that context may play a role, but it is not sufficient to 
explain the disparities. In Chapter 3, the common ratio effect was examined as the complexity 
of choices was manipulated by having either money or objects as outcomes. As prior studies 
did, we found the independence axiom was violated with money, but we did not find this with 
objects. The higher level of consistency with objects should not be taken as evidence of the 
validity of EUT; rather, it is likely to stem from participants resorting to heuristics (such as 
“always choose the prospect with the best payoff”) when choices are too complex and hence 
difficult to make. Both of these chapters provide evidence that decisions may be domain-
specific; this should be taken into account when testing models of decision making in the lab. 
The second part of the thesis focuses on social preferences in the context of fatality and physical 
risk reductions. In Chapter 4, the effect of self-interest on the efficiency-equity trade-off was 
studied. Efficiency was found to be the most important concern, closely followed by equity. Self-
interest significantly modified this trade-off, but the magnitude of this effect was not large 
enough to overturn the general preference for efficiency over equity. On the other hand, stakes 
(whether the risk under consideration was fatal or non-fatal) did not change these preferences.  
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Economic Evaluation of Life and Health 
In many countries, citizens trust their governments to collect taxes and use them to provide 
public healthcare, transport infrastructure and many more services. One of the outcomes of the 
provision of these goods is the reduction of the population’s physical (i.e., illness or injury) and 
fatality risks, thanks to improved healthcare and additional transport safety. Utilitarian 
economists, who measure the success and failure of policies by the change in utility they 
achieve, prescribe that the provision of public sector goods and services should be such that the 
population’s welfare is maximised. This maximisation is subject to the limited availability of 
resources, and hence governments need to prioritise some interventions or policies over others.  
Two tools that inform these trade-offs are cost-benefit analysis (CBA) (Williams, 1974) and cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA; see Neumann, Sanders, Russell, Siegel, and Ganiats, 2016). As their 
names indicate, in these analyses the cost of the resources that would be used up is weighted 
against the welfare increase that the population would accrue. The difference between these 
methods is the units in which the benefit or increase in welfare is measured. In CBA, the benefits 
are measured in monetary units. Benefit metrics used for CBA include the value of statistical life 
(VSL), which has been shown to be equivalent to the population marginal rate of substitution 
between money and risk of death by Jones-Lee (1989) and has been widely used (see meta-
analyses of studies using it by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and De Blaeij, Florax, Rietveld, and Verhoef 
(2003)). Another example is the value of a life year, which was first used by Johannesson and 
Johansson (1996, 1997). In CEA, on the other hand, the effect of interventions is accounted for 
in health benefit units such as quality-adjusted life years (Drummond, Sculpher, Claxton, 
Stoddart & Torrance, 2015) and disability-adjusted life years (Jamison, Mosley, Measham & 
Bobadilla, 1993; Murray, 1996). The advantage of CBA over CEA is that making the trade-off 
between costs and benefits is straightforward, as both are measured in the same units. 
However, as we will explain later in this section, translating health benefits into monetary units 
may be challenging.  
Traditionally, the method used for both health and safety valuation was CBA (Neumann, Goldie 
& Weinstein, 2000) but currently healthcare interventions are mostly appraised using CEA (see 
the 2013 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidelines) while CBA prevails in 




benefits of healthcare and transport safety were estimated using the human capital approach 
(see Johannesson and Jönsson, 1991). This method equated the benefits of health 
improvements to the earnings that would otherwise be lost – find an early application of the 
method in Mushkin (1978). While the benefit metric was easy to compute, this method was 
criticised because it lacked an economic welfare theory foundation (as it ignored people’s 
preferences) and it implied that leisure and retirement had no value (Schelling, 1968; Mishan, 
1971). These critics also highlighted that people do not spend all the money they earn on 
reducing their risk of illness, injury or death, but rather they make trade-offs between their 
money and their risks. Hence, considering the amount of money people would be willing to pay 
to obtain a given risk reduction (or willing to accept to be compensated for the increased risk) 
would be a more appropriate way of measuring the value of health improvements to them. This 
approach is grounded on the economic principle of consumer sovereignty, which states that 
consumers are the best judges of what is best for them (read more in Knox (1960)). Thus, in 
order to maximise welfare, public budgets should be allocated so as to satisfy their preferences.   
Depending on how these preferences are estimated, we distinguish between revealed and 
stated preferences. Revealed preferences are inferred from decisions that members of the 
relevant population make in a related market. One way of capturing these is through hedonic 
wage studies1 (Rosen, 1974), where the estimates of the trade-offs that people make between 
money and physical risk are obtained by looking at the wages of workers that are exposed to 
varying degrees of physical risk in their workplace. In stated preference studies, a representative 
sample of the relevant population is directly asked about their preferences, using interviews 
and/or questionnaires.  
The strength of revealed preference methods is that the values obtained are inferred from real 
decisions instead of hypothetical ones. Their downside is that they make strong assumptions 
about how much people know about risks involved in different situations and ignore the impact 
of factors such as collective bargaining or monopolistic power on wages. Moreover, it may not 
be adequate to extrapolate the findings from a given revealed preference study to people who 
                                                 
1 Not all revealed-preference studies rely on wages. Other studies used to estimate metrics such as the 
VSL have used demand for consumer-safety products, and residential-property values instead – see 
reviews in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Blomquist (2004). However, Cropper, Hammitt and Robinson 
(2011, p. 317) explain that these are usually considered inferior: “Researchers often argue that these 
studies are less suitable for valuation than are hedonic wage or stated-preference studies because of 
difficulties in estimating actual or perceived risks, the need to make assumptions about key factors such 
as time costs (in some product studies), whether cancers are likely to be fatal (in some hedonic property 




are not facing those decisions. Stated preference methods do give hypothetical answers and the 
way in which participants perceive and respond to questions can sometimes be problematic. 
For example, answers suffer from embedding, which makes respondents declare similar 
willingness to pay for a subset and for the whole benefit (Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992; Hausman, 
2012). But they provide answers that are tailored to the scenario of interest from a 
representative sample of the population.  
Stated preference techniques for CEA can be classified in two categories, depending on the 
response method – see Drummond et al. (2015) for a comprehensive review of these methods. 
Under scaling, the most popular method is the visual analogue scale or VAS – Torrance, Feeny 
and Furlong (2001) provide a critical appraisal of this method. Under choice, the most commonly 
used are the standard gamble or SG (Torrance, 1986; Bennett & Torrance, 1996), the time trade-
off or TTO (Torrance, Thomas & Sackett, 1972), and the person trade-off or PTO (Patrick et al., 
1973; Nord, 1992). In these, respondents are asked to make trade-offs between different health 
states with different levels of risk (SG), durations (TTO), and numbers of people affected (PTO).  
The most relevant elicitation technique to obtain monetary estimates of the benefits is 
contingent valuation (CV), also known as the willingness-to-pay (WTP) approach. Respondents 
are asked how much money they would be willing to pay for a physical risk reduction or health 
improvement (or willing to accept as compensation for taking the risk or being in ill health), 
contingent on a market for the benefit existing. It was first used by Davis (1963) and further 
developed in the area of transport safety by economists such as Jones-Lee (e.g., 1976, 1985), 
but it has also been used in the area of healthcare – see reviews by Smith (2003), McIntosh, 
Clarke, Frew & Louviere (2010), and Donaldson, Mason & Shackley (2012).  
In the UK, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (2013) and the Department for 
Transport (2018) endorse the use of stated preference methods to estimate the value of 
physical and fatality risk reductions. However, using these methods to estimate societal 
preferences presents several challenges. The wish to gain a better understanding of these 
challenges and the possible policy-relevant implications that may come with this motivates the 
research in this thesis. Drawing on this question, we will also learn more about judgement and 





It is of paramount importance to obtain estimates of the value of physical risk reductions that 
accurately reflect society’s concerns. Otherwise, public budgets of millions of pounds could be 
sub-optimally allocated, resulting in an over-provision of some publicly provided goods and 
services in detriment of others that would have achieved a higher welfare increase. However, a 
substantial body of empirical evidence casts doubt on the reliability of the value estimates 
elicited with the methods outlined in the previous section, and their validity as accurate 
expressions of people’s preferences.  
The methods outlined above offer different ways of eliciting the value of health improvements 
or life extensions to society. According to the principle of procedural invariance (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984), the estimates obtained should be the same regardless of the method used to 
elicit them, but that is not what is found. Jones-Lee, Chilton, Metcalf & Nielsen (1995) used both 
the CV and SG methods to elicit the value of several non-fatal health states. They then computed 
the ratios between each of the states and a worse one, to find out how bad they were relative 
to each other. They found that the SG ratios were smaller than those from CV, implying that the 
SG elicited less severe judgements of the health states than CV did. Along the same lines, Dolan, 
Gudex, Kind and Williams (1996) found differences between the estimates from the SG and the 
TTO method. They elicited health state value estimates that could range from 0 (death) to 1 
(best health), and found that the median values were generally at least 5% higher when the TTO 
method was used, compared to the SG. Bleichrodt, Pinto and Abellán-Perpiñán (2003) found 
the same, although a few other studies found the opposite (e.g., Rutten-van Molken, Bakker, 
van Doorslaer & Van Der Linden, 1995; Stiggelbout et al., 1994; Bennett & Torrance, 1996). This 
is only a sample of the studies that compare estimates elicited with different methods and find 
that there are disparities, but the evidence does not end there – for example, see a comparison 
of SG and VAS by Llewellyn-Thomas et al. (1984) or Torrance et al. (1996); one of CV vs. TTO by 
Gyrd-Hansen, Kjær and Nielsen (2012); and a comparison of SG, TTO, and CV, and other scaling 
methods by Frober and Kane (1989). 
These findings question the appropriateness of using these methods to inform public policy, but 
their alternatives (e.g., using the effect of health on happiness to determine how to increase the 
population’s welfare (Dolan & White, 2007; Dolan, Layard, & Metcalfe, 2011)) are not exempt 
from problems (Dolan, 2011). That is why understanding better the reasons behind the 




Out of all the methods, the most worrying evidence comes from the two that have the strongest 
theoretical background: the CV method (Jones-Lee, 1989) and the SG method (Brazier, 2005; 
Drummond et al., 2015). They are both grounded on expected utility theory (EUT), which as 
Schoemaker (1982), Camerer (1995) and many others since have argued, may lack descriptive 
validity (i.e., accuracy when describing how people do make decisions, rather than how they 
ought to). 
The deviations from EUT predictions found when using the CV are numerous. Theory predicts 
that the preferences people state should only be affected by changes in the elements they are 
trading off. Depending on the elicitation method, these could be the severity of the health 
impairment, the magnitude of the risk reduction, duration, or the number of affected people. 
However, value estimates have been found to hinge on irrelevant factors (such as the wording 
and the order in which the questions were asked) while being insensitive to changes in the 
factors that matter (mentioned above) (e.g., Kartman, Stålhammar, & Johannesson, 1996; 
Beattie et al., 1998; Carthy et al., 1999; Abellán-Perpiñán, Martínez-Pérez, Méndez-Martínez, 
Pinto-Prades, & Sánchez- Martínez, 2011).  
Less is known about the failure of EUT in the SG method. This is the focus of the first part of this 
research. Value estimates can be elicited using one-stage or two-stage SGs (a full description of 
these is provided in the next chapter). EUT’s reduction of compound lotteries axiom (RCLA) 
postulates that these two variants of the SG should elicit the same estimates. However, this is 
not what has been found empirically (Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1982; Rutten-van Molke et al., 
1995; Bleichrodt, 2001; Oliver, 2003). In Chapter 2, we aim to find out whether the disparities 
found within the SG method are due to the RCLA failure or whether context is responsible. we 
use context to refer to the affective nature of the good being valued, the lack of realism due to 
the absence of incentives, and the complexity of the choice (which is given by the ease with 
which the dimensions of the goods can be compared).  
Others have previously looked at choice complexity and its effect on decision making. Although 
choice complexity has no unanimous definition, each author’s own conceptualisation always 
encompasses at least some of the following features. Namely, the number of questions in the 
task (e.g., Dave, Eckel, Johnson & Rojas, 2010; Shiloh, Koren, & Zakay, 2001), the number of 
alternatives in the choice (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Shiloh, Koren, & Zakay, 2001), 
the number of attributes or dimensions in each alternative (e.g, Greifeneder, Scheibehenne, & 
Kleber, 2010; Danthurebandara, Yu, & Vandebroek, 2011), the levels and the range of the 




Louviere, 1999), the correlation between these attributes (in the cases the attributes can be 
expressed in numerical terms, e.g., price, weight, battery life, etc. in the case of mobile phones) 
(e.g., Mazzotta & Opaluch, 1995; DeShazo & Fermo, 2002), and the similarity of the alternatives 
in utility terms (e.g., Swait & Adamowicz, 2001a; Dellaert, Donkers, & Soest, 2002). In an attempt 
to provide an overall measure of complexity, Swait and Adamowicz (2001b) develop an 
‘entropy’ metric. This measure comprises the impact of the number of alternatives and 
attributes, the correlation between attributes, and how close in utility terms the alternatives 
are. 
The higher the number of choices, alternatives, etc., the harder it is for people to make decisions 
(Timmermans & Vlek, 1992; Swait & Adamowicz, 2001a). Higher choice complexity has been 
found to lead to more noisy answers (Dave et al., 2010), higher response errors 
(Danthurebandara, Yu, & Vandebroek, 2001), and changes in choice strategy (e.g., Olshavsky, 
1979; Timmermans, 1993; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988, 1993; Ball, 1997; Swait & 
Adamowicz, 2001a; Dellaert, Brazell & Louviere, 2012). Most importantly, previous research has 
found a relationship between choice complexity and consistency. The work by Jacoby, Speller, 
and Kohn (1974), Jacoby, Speller, and Berning (1974), and Keller and Staelin (1987) links 
consistency with the amount of information that participants need to process, finding that the 
higher choice complexity is, the less consistency there is. DeShazo and Fermo (2002) also 
manipulate choice complexity, and using a random utility model they are able to quantify the 
effect of choice complexity on utility estimates, and hence its effect on consistency. Caussade, 
de Dios Ortúzar, Rizzi and Hensher (2005) find similar results. Arentze, Borgers, Timmermans 
and DelMistro (2003) do not find a change in the error variance when they manipulate the 
number of alternatives, but they do when they manipulated the number of dimensions per 
alternative. 
The above-mentioned research on choice complexity has been done using a lot of different 
goods, all within the same domain. That is, it tells us more about how choice complexity affects 
decisions between a few mobile phones that vary in dimensions such as price, battery life, and 
memory size (Fasolo, Carmeci, & Misuraca, 2009). Other goods used are monetary lotteries 
(Payne et al., 1988), university majors (Shiloh et al., 2001), jobs (Keller & Staelin, 1987), 
apartments and stereo receivers (Olshavsky, 1979), landfill locations (Mazzota & Opaluch, 
16995), and transport routes (Caussade et al., 2005), just to name a few. However, the existing 
literature does not shed light on how complexity brought by having to choose between goods 




common, but do not share a lot of their other characteristics), would affect consistency. The 
current research contributes to reduce this gap in the literature.  
In Chapter 3, we turn to another well-known deviation from EUT: the common ratio effect, a 
preference shift that occurs when the probabilities of the better outcomes in two prospects are 
scaled down by the same factor. It was used by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to show that 
people’s actual decisions deviate from EUT predictions. In this chapter, the premise is that 
people’s everyday decisions are not quite as simple as those that they make in the laboratory, 
where they are asked to make trade-offs between two uni-dimensional scales (money and 
probability). The goal of this chapter is to further explore the role that choice complexity 
brought by divergence in the outcome attributes may play in decision making. Neither EUT nor 
any of its most prominent alternatives (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky’s (cumulative) prospect 
theory (1979; 1992)) predict choice complexity to have an effect on decisions. It is crucial to find 
out more about this since a lot of the existing models of decision making are being developed 
and tested using evidence from simplified choices between monetary payoffs. More 
importantly, these models are then being generalised to decision making with all outcomes 
without checking that behave is essentially the same in the new environment. 
The second part of this research shifts away from the value elicitation methods to focus on the 
metrics that capture value. We want these metrics to be a good representation of people’s 
preferences. Yet, we rely on standard economic theory that assumes that people are exclusively 
self-interested, (expected) utility maximising agents, while there is a great deal of empirical 
evidence suggesting that people also have social preferences (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 2001). This 
evidence implies that people may not only care about their own risk reduction, but they would 
also be willing to give up some of their own resources in order to make other individuals better 
off. It also suggests that people may not only be concerned about maximising output, in this 
case the overall risk reduction (efficiency), but they may prefer to have the benefit evenly 
distributed across the population (equity), even when it comes at the expense of efficiency. If 
the metrics do not account for this, they may fail to provide an accurate representation of the 
population’s preferences. The question addressed in Chapter 4 is how the balance of self-
interest and altruism affects the efficiency-equity trade-off. The findings from this study should 
give us a better idea of how value metrics should best account for the populations’ preferences.  
In the remaining of this thesis, the three above-mentioned chapters follow. The thesis then 







Chapter 2.                                                                                                    
Can Context Explain the Disparities                                                         
between the Direct and Indirect Standard Gamble Estimates?          





The standard gamble (SG) method is widely used to elicit societal preferences about health. 
With the SG method, the elicitation can be done directly (in a single stage) or indirectly (two-
stages). According to expected utility theory’s (EUT) reduction of compound lotteries axiom 
(RCLA), the estimates elicited with these two procedures should be the same. However, when 
valuing health, the estimates elicited indirectly have been found to be significantly higher than 
the direct estimates (e.g., Oliver, 2003). This challenges the appropriateness of using these 
estimates to inform policy, and calls for a greater understanding the disparities found between 
the estimates. We aim to find out whether these disparities should be fully attributed to the 
failure of RCLA or whether the preference elicitation context is also playing a role. We use 
context to refer to the abstract and affective nature of the good being valued, the lack of 
incentives, and the complexity of the choice. We manipulated choice complexity by asking 
questions involving outcomes (with the same probability and subjective value) that were either 
money or consumer goods. We found that when complexity was the lowest, the disparities still 
persisted. This indicates that context alone is not sufficient to explain the disparities. While the 
number of consistent estimates was approximately the same for money and objects, we found 
that the direction of the disparities changed depending on whether the objects shared some 
dimensions or not. These findings call for caution when using the SG method, and provide 
evidence that subjective value is not the only characteristic of the outcomes that influences 
decisions; their complexity matters too.  






Most economists and government bodies such as the UK Treasury (2018) and the US Office of 
Management and Budget (20032) agree that the allocation of budgets to public healthcare and 
transport safety should be done according to the affected population’s preferences (Carthy et 
al., 1999). These preferences are used to estimate the societal value of the benefits that would 
be generated by the policies or interventions. One of the methods used to elicit people’s 
preferences, risk preferences in particular, is the standard gamble (SG). This method has been 
favoured over others because it reflects the risk involved in decisions involving health, and 
because of its theoretical grounding on expected utility theory (EUT; Oliver, 2003).  
The axioms of EUT imply that we can locate the utility of any outcome x on a utility scale 
between two defined boundary outcomes. The lower bound corresponds to the utility of an 
outcome less preferred than x, and the upper bound to that of a more preferred outcome. In its 
simplest form, which we refer to as the direct SG scenario, outcome x is compared to a lottery 
that offers the upper bound outcome with probability p, and the lower bound outcome with 
probability 1-p. Normalising the utilities of the bounds to 1 and 0, the utility of x, for an expected 
utility maximiser, is given by p. When used to value health, the SG method allows us to find out 
how a given non-fatal health state compares to full health and death. The SG scenario offers 
two options: the certainty of being in the non-fatal health state being valued, or a chance of full 
health (otherwise death). The probability of ending up in full health that makes respondents 
indifferent between the certain and the risky options is the utility of the non-fatal health state 
relative to that of death and full health, which are set to 0 and 1. 
If EUT’s reduction of compound lotteries axiom (RCLA) holds, then we can elicit the utility of x 
indirectly through two or more linked SG scenarios. We introduce a new reference outcome y, 
whose utility lies between that of x and the lower bound outcome. In the first gamble, we elicit 
the utility of outcome x relative to that of the original upper bound and y; in the second gamble, 
the utility of outcome y is elicited relative to the original bounds. Combining these estimates 
reveals the utility of x relative to the original bounds. Importantly, if the RCLA holds, the direct 
and indirect utility estimates for outcome x should not differ.  
We heavily rely on the equivalence between the direct and indirect utility estimates for x when 
valuing health. Direct elicitation can be problematic when the valued health state lies very close 
                                                 
2 This Circular was still in place in 2017 – see Perkins and Carey (2017), the latest available edition of the 




to one of the extremes; this is the case, for example, when valuing mild health conditions. In 
such cases, the difference between the utilities of the upper bound (i.e., full health) and the 
health state may be minimal, making people unable to discriminate well enough between large 
indifference probabilities and 1. Using different bounds allows us to increase the relative 
distance between the bound and the outcome being valued, increasing the sensitivity of the 
elicitation procedure. Following the indirect elicitation example above, the new reference 
outcome y could be a severe but non-fatal health state. Considering the mild health state in 
relation to full health and outcome y, rather than death, would make the difference between 
the mild condition and full health more visible. This, in turn, would make respondents’ estimates 
of the utility of the mild condition distinct from 1. 
In actual health valuation studies, the direct and indirect utility estimates have been found to 
differ systematically, in violation of the RCLA. When replacing the original lower bound (e.g., 
death) by a new one (e.g., a less severe illness or injury), the indirect estimates have been found 
to be significantly higher than the direct ones (Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1982; Rutten-van Molke 
and et al., 1995; Bleichrodt, 2001; Oliver, 2003).  
We conceive of two possible explanations for the disparities found in the health literature. The 
first is that EUT, and particularly the RCLA, do not accurately describe individual decision making. 
The RCLA requires a linear treatment of probabilities, hence one way this axiom could fail is if 
people treated probabilities non-linearly. Bleichrodt (2001) and Oliver (2003) explored whether 
SG choices would be better described by different specifications of cumulative prospect theory 
(CPT; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Both Bleichrodt and Oliver found that applying an inverse-S 
shaped probability weighting function, of the kind proposed in CPT, did not result in better 
descriptive accuracy compared to EUT.  Oliver also investigated whether different specifications 
of CPT (probability transformation and loss aversion weighting, probability transformation only, 
loss aversion weighting only, and the transformation of small and large probabilities only) would 
do better than EUT. Out of those, the one specification that resulted in improvements in 
descriptive validity compared to EUT was the addition of loss aversion only. 
Alternatively, the disparities may be induced by some of the features of the design, or context, 
of the SG method. Some of these are inherent characteristics of health. Health is affect-rich, i.e., 
considering (hypothetical) health states may prompt affective reactions that other outcomes 
may not prompt, and these reactions may push respondents to react in extreme ways. Beattie 
et al. (1998) had suggested that dealing with death could be too emotional, and Carthy et al. 




conditions, implying that the more severe conditions are, the harder it is for people to make 
decisions. Moreover, choices in health valuation studies are very complex, in that they require 
respondents to make trade-offs between items that vary along many dimensions that are hard 
to compare to each other. Last, answers in health valuation studies cannot be incentivised, and 
this may raise questions about the quality of respondents’ answers3.  
Our goal is to examine whether the disparities between the direct and indirect SG utility 
estimates are caused by the elicitation context or the lack of validity of the RCLA. We simplify 
the elicitation context as much as we can to give the RCLA a good chance of holding. First, in 
order to rule out the impact of affect, we steer away from health and use simpler outcomes. In 
our study, half of the gamble scenarios have everyday objects as outcomes, and in the other 
half the outcomes are the money amounts that each participant stated were equivalent in value 
to the objects. The money amounts allow us to explore the validity of the RCLA when choices 
are the least complex.  Here, the complexity of a choice is defined depending on its outcomes. 
The lower the fraction of the dimensions that can be used to compare the outcomes to each 
other, the more complex the decision is. For instance, questions involving money amounts are 
the least complex because the outcomes have one dimension only, and it is shared. By 
comparing the money utility estimates with those elicited using objects, we can observe the 
effect of increasing choice complexity while the subjective value of the outcomes remains 
constant. Using consumer goods and money also frees our results from the possible time 
discounting confound (see Gafni (1994) for a more detailed discussion) as, unlike health, our 
outcomes materialise with no delay. Another advantage of using these goods is that we can fully 
incentivise responses. 
The high stakes in health valuation make understanding these disparities crucial. EUT and the 
RCLA provide the theoretical grounding for the chaining in the SG method and hence the 
estimates elicited with it. If this theory is not descriptively valid, then there is no reason to 
believe that the estimates derived from it accurately reflect the population’s preferences. Public 
                                                 
3 The provision of incentives is crucial in experimental economics. Smith (1982) formalised this as the 
nonsatiation precept, which implies that in order to achieve a controlled experimental environment 
where respondents truthfully reveal their preferences, respondents’ rewards should be directly linked to 
their decisions during the study. In studies where participants need to choose between lotteries with 
monetary payoffs, participants shall be paid an amount of money according to their choices at the end of 
the session. However, when the choices respondents are making involve physical and fatality risks it is 




policy decisions based on such estimates could result in millions of pounds sub-optimally 
allocated to the wrong treatments or safety measures (e.g., Carthy et al., 1999). 
We found substantial disparities between the direct and indirect estimates. That is, under the 
most favourable conditions we could set up, the RCLA was often not descriptively valid. With 
regards to our complexity manipulation, we found that even though participants had stated that 
the objects and the money amounts were equally valuable to them, whether objects or money 
were used in the elicitation systematically influenced the utility estimates. Looking at the direct 
estimates (elicited with a single gamble scenario), we found that participants were less risk 
averse with objects than they were in gambles with their counterpart money equivalents. 
Looking at the comparison between the direct and the indirect estimates, we found that 
whereas the amount of disparities was approximately the same for all payoffs, for objects the 
distribution of the disparities between the estimates was skewed in opposite directions 
depending on how complex the choice between them was (i.e., depending on the fraction of 
comparable dimensions they had).  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 includes a summary of the theory 
underpinning the standard gamble, and previous empirical work on the consistency between 
the direct and indirect utility estimates. Section 3 explains the design of our study. Section 4 
examines our results. And the chapter concludes with the discussion of our results, in section 5. 
2.2. Theoretical Background 
2.2.1. Consistency Requirement in the Standard Gamble Method 
EUT is a general theory that applies to consequences of any kind. Consider four outcomes A, B, 
C and D such that u(A) > u(B) > u(C) > u(D) where u(.) is a standard Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern utility function (1944). In order to elicit the utility of the intermediate outcome B 
directly and indirectly, respondents would see three SG scenarios (P, Q, and R) such as those in 
Figure 1. Throughout this paper, we use ‘SG scenario’ to refer to a two-prospect choice. Consider 
gamble scenario P. The sure prospect offers a given outcome for certain. The risky prospect is a 
two-outcome lottery: one of the outcomes is better than the one given for certain and is offered 
with probability p; the other outcome is worse than the certain one, and is associated with 
probability 1-p. For each of the SG scenarios, we elicit respondents’ indifference probability (p, 
q and r):  the chance of receiving the best outcome that they would require to be equally well 














According to EUT, the utility of a prospect corresponds to the expectation of the utility of its 
payoffs. When respondents are indifferent between the two prospects of an SG scenario, the 
utilities of the intermediate outcomes in each of the scenarios are given by the following 
equations. 
𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑃: 𝑢(𝐵)𝑃 = 𝑝 · 𝑢(𝐴) + (1 − 𝑝) · 𝑢(𝐷)   (1) 
𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑄: 𝑢(𝐵)𝑄 = 𝑞 · 𝑢(𝐴) + (1 − 𝑞) · 𝑢(𝐶)   (2) 
𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑅: 𝑢(𝐶)𝑅 = 𝑟 · 𝑢(𝐴) + (1 − 𝑟) · 𝑢(𝐷)   (3)
  
The utility of intermediate outcome B can be elicited directly using scenario P: an estimate of 
this utility u(B)P is given by equation (1). The RCLA implies that an indirect estimate of the utility 
of B (u(B)PQ) can be obtained by combining the estimates from scenarios Q and R as follows. 
After we normalise the utility of the best outcome (A) to 1, and that of the worst outcome (D) 
to 0, equations (1) to (3) become the following. 
𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑃: 𝑢(𝐵)𝑃 = 𝑝      (4) 
𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑄: 𝑢(𝐵)𝑄 = 𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞) · 𝑢(𝐶)𝑅    (5) 
𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑅: 𝑢(𝐶)𝑅 = 𝑟       (6) 
Equations (5) and (6) can be further combined into equation (7), which captures the estimate of 
the utility of the intermediate outcome B in terms of the indifference probabilities of scenarios 
Q and R.  
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𝑢(𝐵)𝑄𝑅 = 𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞) · 𝑟    (7) 
If EUT and the RCLA held, we would expect scenarios P, and Q and R to give consistent estimates 
of the utility of the intermediate outcome B. That is, the utility of outcome B given by gamble P 
(u(B)P, equation (4)) and that given by scenarios Q and R (u(B)QR, equation (7)) should be the 
same.  
If the direct and indirect elicitation procedures result in the same estimate, then equations (4) 
to (6) can be combined into one to express the consistency requirement in terms of the 
indifference probabilities of the three gambles.  
𝑝 = 𝑞 + 𝑟 − 𝑞 · 𝑟     (8) 
As depicted in Figure 1, the indirect estimation in this paper is done by chaining through the 
failure outcome (the worst one in the gamble scenario): scenario R is used to elicit the utility of 
the worst outcome of scenario Q, rather than the success outcome (the best one in scenario Q). 
When valuing health, chaining through different outcomes (either failure or success) has 
systematically influenced whether or not the consistency requirement is met (e.g., Bleichrodt, 
2001; Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1982; Rutten-van Molken et al., 1995). Namely, chaining through 
the success outcome results in consistent estimates, whereas chaining through failure results in 
the indirect estimates being larger. Because the goal of this study is to understand further these 
disparities, we chose the methodology that has been found to produce them. 
2.2.2. Failures of the Consistency Requirement 
It is not only in the health and safety valuation context that the RCLA has been found to fail. 
There is a substantial body of research that has refuted the axiom in the lab. Studies generally 
present the reduced and compound forms of a choice (equivalent to our direct and indirect 
elicitation procedures) and observe whether, as should happen if the RCLA held, participants do 
choose the same prospect irrespective of the version of the choice that has been presented.  
There is some evidence from non-monetary domains: Ebert and van de Kuilen (2016) found the 
violation of the axiom using waiting time as the outcome, and Deck and Schlesinger (2016), using 
pleasant and unpleasant jelly beans. Most of the studies, though, test the validity of the axiom 
using monetary outcomes. For example, Bar-Hillel (1973) asked participants to choose between 
the reduced and compound forms of the choice to investigate whether conjunctive and 
disjunctive events were judged differently. She found that the RCLA failed to describe behaviour. 




‘isolating’ or ignoring the first stage of the compound lottery. Keller (1985a) found that the 
violation was susceptible to the presentation mode. They tested the axiom representing the 
choices with drawings of marbles in tubes, bar graphs, written description, and matrices where 
cell sizes were proportional to the probability. She found a percentage of violations that ranged 
from 32% (with the marbles) to 45% (with the matrices). Bernasconi and Loomes (1992), who 
were studying two-stage Ellsberg-type (1961) of problems, also found that the axiom was 
violated. Bernasconi and Bernhofer (2017) also observed the violation in the laboratory with 
monetary consequences, but with a tax evasion framing instead of the usual neutral one.  
On the other hand, Harrison, Martin-Correa, and Swarthout (2015) found that the violation took 
place when one out of all the questions were incentivised, but it disappeared when respondents 
answered one question only which was incentivised for sure. Using the same procedure as the 
studies above (i.e., having participants choose between prospects in both the reduced and 
compound forms of the choice), Hajimoladarvish (2018) did not find evidence against the 
validity of the axiom either. 
It is worth noting that the task in this study and the one used to elicit health state utilities are 
not choice tasks, but rather (probability) equivalence tasks. It is well-established that choice and 
equivalence tasks may elicit different preferences. The classic example of this is the preference 
reversal between the p-bet and the $-bet, first reported by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), and Lindman (1971). Despite both gambles having similar 
expected value, in a choice exercise respondents would choose the p-bet (high probability, low 
payoff), while in an equivalence task they would state a higher certainty equivalent for the $-
bet (low probability, high payoff). Butler and Loomes (2007) find the opposite preference 
reversal when, instead of using certainty equivalents, the preferences stated in the choice task 
are compared to those inferred from respondents’ probability equivalents, which is what we 
elicit with the SG method. 
We found three studies that test the validity of the axiom using a certainty equivalence task 
rather than a choice task: Miao and Zhong (2012), Abdellaoui, Klibanoff, and Placido (2015), and 
Hajimoladarvish (2018). All three found evidence against the validity of the RCLA using monetary 
outcomes. To our best knowledge, there is only one study that used a probability equivalence 
task and non-health outcomes: Spencer (1998), where the outcomes were money amounts. 
Chilton and Spencer (2001) used Spencer’s data to explore the consistency between the SG 




held in half of their comparisons. When the RCLA failed, contrary to what happens with health, 
they found the direct utility estimates were higher than the indirect ones. 
Chilton and Spencer’s results provide valuable insights regarding the validity of the RCLA in a 
setup close to that in health valuation studies, but they do not answer our question regarding 
the effect of context on the disparities found when using the SG method. With their design, it is 
not possible to disentangle which of the two factors that differentiated Spencer’s study was 
behind the occurrence and the direction of the disparities found. Differences may have been 
found because they used money instead of health outcomes, so choices were less complex. But 
it may have also been that they chained through the success outcome, rather than the failure 
one, as previous studies that had found the disparities did. Further, at no point were the utilities 
of the money amounts and health directly compared, hence the differences in disparities across 
studies could be due to differences in the utilities of the outcomes, rather than because they 
were health-related or not. Last, their answers were not incentive compatible (Spencer, 
personal communication, July 20, 2018). While this could help to make health and money 
valuation studies more comparable, it prevents the study from shedding light on the role of (the 
lack of) incentives in the disparities found.  
2.2.3. Possible Reasons for the Failures 
We hypothesise that other than the lack of descriptive validity of the RCLA, the disparities found 
may be caused by the context of valuation studies. One of these contextual factors is the nature 
of the good being valued.   
First, health is affect-rich, so considering it may trigger a strong emotional response. In this 
study, we elicit preferences over goods that are not affect-laden: our outcomes A, B and C are 
everyday objects and money (the remaining outcome, D, is to receive nothing). Most people will 
be familiar with money and the objects in our experiment, which should not carry strong 
emotional responses, and this allows us to rule out the effect of affect. 
Second, decisions involving health states are complex: health varies along many dimensions that 
are difficult to compare to each other, and it is very abstract; it may be difficult to conceptualise 
for people, especially if they have never experienced the given health states before. We link 
choice complexity to the ease with which consequence dimensions can be compared. More 




terms, the choice will be4. For instance, in a choice between £5 and £10, there is only one 
dimension to consider: the amount of money. Because the only dimension is comparable across 
consequences, this choice will be relatively simple. In contrast, consider choosing between a 
coffee machine and a pair of jeans. Each of these items has lots of dimensions, and only a very 
small fraction of them are comparable. Hence, this decision would be much more complex, and 
harder to make.  
From lower to higher complexity, we ask participants to make choices between lotteries that 
involve (1) the money amounts that each participant had stated were equivalent in value to the 
objects (they have the ‘amount’ dimension only, and it is shared), (2) similar objects (which have 
some obvious comparable dimension but differ in the rest of them, i.e., alarm clocks with 
different additional features), and (3) dissimilar objects (which do not have obvious comparable 
dimensions, e.g., a toaster and a pair of headphones). 
Manipulating choice complexity allows us to test whether this is one the contextual factors that 
may affect consistency. Given EUT’s prediction that people make decisions on the basis of the 
utility or subjective value of the outcomes but not their comparability to each other, consistency 
should be the same regardless the complexity of the choice. However, we hypothesise that the 
smaller the fraction of shared dimensions, the more difficult it will be to make choices, and the 
less consistency there will be. To our best knowledge, no study to date has investigated the 
effect of shared or divergent dimensions (which we characterise as choice complexity) on 
consistency. But difficulty induced by an increasing number of alternatives in a choice, 
dimensions, correlation among these dimensions, etc. has been found to have a negative effect 
on consistency (e.g., DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; Arentze et al., 2003; Caussade et al., 2005). 
Using consumer goods and money also enables us to capture the effect of another factor that 
could be causing the disparities, the lack of incentives. In theory, incentive compatibility ensures 
that it is in respondents’ best interest to provide truthful answers to the questions we pose to 
them. However, in many of the previous studies using the SG method respondents were valuing 
health, so for obvious ethical reasons, their answers could not be incentivised. The reason for 
                                                 
4 Note that this definition should also apply to health. For example, a choice between two health states 
defined in terms of the same dimensions (e.g., EQ-5D (Brooks, 1996) dimensions: mobility, self-care, usual 
activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression) should be relatively less complex than one where one 
health state is defined with the EQ-5D instrument, and the other is defined with another instrument which 
differs in some of the dimensions (e.g., SF-6D (Brazier, Roberts & Deverill, 2002), where the dimensions 




the disparate answers found when valuing health could hence be that respondents were not 
devoting enough effort to accessing their true preferences. 
2.3. Method 
2.3.1. Design and Procedure 
In order to test the consistency between the direct and indirect utility estimates, and between 
the estimates elicited with objects and money amounts, we need respondents’ monetary 
valuations of the objects and their indifference probabilities for the gamble scenarios. In order 
to elicit these, we conducted the following study at the University of Warwick. 
Participants completed five different tasks on a computer (see Figure 2), all to do with objects 
and money amounts: familiarisation, riskless pairwise choice, ranking, valuation, and risky 
pairwise choice. The first four tasks were carefully designed to elicit respondents’ valuations of 
the objects. They gave respondents several chances to reflect upon their preferences before 
they gave a monetary valuation that was as precise as possible. The fifth and last task is the one 
we used to obtain participants’ indifference probabilities.  
Figure 2. Study Flow 
 
Familiarisation 
The 10 objects5 involved in the decisions respondents made throughout the study (Figure 3) 
were on display at the lab and participants were encouraged to have a look at them before the 
experimental session started. Within these objects, there were three chosen to have at least 
                                                 
5 These objects were chosen out of a pool of 30 objects based on their desirability (as reported by 
respondents in a pilot study; see more details about the pilot studies in Appendix A). 
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one dimension in common (‘similar objects’ set; an alarm clock, an alarm clock with a radio, and 
an alarm clock with a radio and a Bluetooth speaker). Three other objects were chosen so that 
they were dissimilar to each other in terms of their dimensions. These were an air mattress, a 
clicker (used in presentations to navigate the slides and point at the screen), and a toaster, and 
we refer to them as ‘dissimilar objects’. The remaining objects (a bottle, a headphones set, a 
computer mouse, and a suitcase) were included to add variety in this study, and for answering 
questions that are not relevant in this study.  
Figure 3. Consumer Goods in this Study 
 













Toaster Bottle Headphones Mouse Suitcase 
The study started with the object familiarisation task: participants saw each object on their 
screen together with a brief description. At any point during the study, participants could click 
on the image of the objects to see this information again. They also had this information on 
printed cards on their desks. To encourage them to think about each object, we also asked them 
whether they owned such object, and how much they would like to receive them (on a 7-point 
scale from “not at all” to “very much”). 
Riskless Pairwise Choices 
Then, participants made pairwise choices that involved no risk. This task was included in the 
study after findings from a pilot study suggested it would be helpful to participants in order to 
introspect about their preferences with regards to the objects (see more details about this pilot 
study in Appendix A.1). In this task, respondents had to indicate which item, out of two, they 




possible combination of two out of the ten objects, and 30 were choices between one object 
and a money amount (either £5.25, £8.75, or £19.50). The money amounts were included in this 
task to ease respondents into the valuation task, where they had to think of their money 
equivalents for the objects. The three money amounts were carefully picked so that participants 
did not take them as anchors and that influenced their valuations.  
Respondents had the incentive to make each of these choices carefully because at the end of 
the study, one of these choices could be randomly selected, in which case they would receive 
the item they said they preferred.  
Ranking 
Based on each respondent’s answers in the riskless pairwise choice questions, a provisional 
ranking of preference was inferred, and respondents were invited to adjust it to better 
represent their preferences if necessary. They had an incentive to do so, because if the ranking 
task was chosen to be played out for real at the end of the study, two of the items would be 
selected at random, and respondents would receive the one they had ranked higher. 
Valuation 
Once the ranking was submitted, the valuation task started, and participants could see their 
ranking on the screen again. Participants had to drag and drop each item (the 10 objects and 3 
money amounts) to the cell in a ladder with the amount of money they considered equivalent 
to the item6. For example, if according to one respondent, the headphones were as valuable to 
them as £19.25, that respondent would drag the picture of the headphones to the cell with the 
“£19.25” label (as shown in Figure 4). The money amounts in the ladder started at £0 and 
increased in £0.25 intervals, but one could scroll up indefinitely.  
  
                                                 
6 The instructions in the valuation task were the following: “We want to know what amount of money 
you regard as equivalent to the items you just ranked. That is, we would like you to tell us what amount 
of money YOU PERSONALLY regard as being exactly as desirable TO YOU as the item. Please try to forget 
about what it might cost in the shops or online. Just think: if you had to choose between this item and 
some money, what amount of money would make you feel you could spin a coin and be equally happy to 





Figure 4. Detail of the Valuation Interface 
 
The elicited monetary valuations (or money equivalents) were used to construct the gamble 
scenarios. First, they allowed us to find out about the relative ordering of the objects within the 
similar and dissimilar objects sets; this determined which object would appear in the gamble 
scenarios as outcome A, B and C7. Second, they were used to substitute the objects in the money 
gambles.  
In the valuation task, the incentive scheme was based on Becker-DeGroot-Marschak’s (1964) 
procedure: one of the items was randomly picked, and its valuation according to the participant 
was compared to a random money amount8. If the randomly-generated money amount was 
higher than the stated valuation, the participant received the random sum of money rather than 
the object; whereas if the money amount was less than the stated value, the participant 
received the object. If the two were exactly the same, then a toss of a coin would determine 
whether the participant would receive the money or the object. 
Risky Pairwise Choices  
Last, participants completed 100 risky pairwise choices, where they had to choose the prospect 
they preferred out of two. Not all of these questions were relevant for this study. The choices 
of interest can be organised in 4 groups, each of which comprise gamble scenarios P, Q and R 
with a different set of outcomes. The questions in the first group involved the similar objects. In 
                                                 
7 When someone had given the same valuation to two or more objects within one of the objects set, the 
tie was solved at random. For 79% of participants, there was never a tie, and the remaining 21% had a tie 
in one of the sets (9 participants), or two ties within one of the sets (3 participants). This does not affect 
our ability to run the planned analyses, as we are testing consistency. 
8 This random money amount was drawn by the computer from a uniform distribution with minimum £0, 
maximum £31.50, with £0.25 intervals. The maximum amount of money, £31.50, was the highest median 
out of all the valuations in the first pilot study. Respondents were not told about the distribution, as this 





the second group, the payoffs were each participant’s monetary valuations of the similar 
objects. The third group had the dissimilar objects as outcomes, and the fourth, their money 
equivalents. In addition to the objects and their monetary equivalents, scenarios P and R 
featured an additional payoff that was intended to be the least preferred one, receiving nothing. 
Figure 5 provides an example of SG scenario Q for a participant whose relative ordering of the 
similar objects was radio-speaker alarm clock ≻ radio alarm clock ≻ alarm clock, making the 
radio-speaker alarm clock payoff A, the radio alarm clock payoff B, and the alarm clock payoff 
C. In this example, the sure prospect offers the radio alarm clock for certain, and the risky 
prospect offers an 80% chance of receiving the radio-speaker alarm clock, and a 20% chance of 
receiving the alarm clock. In the choices, probabilities were presented numerically, but also in 
terms of occurrence with coloured balls (each representing a 5% chance), as it has been 
suggested that presenting probabilities in terms of frequencies makes it easier for people to 
process them (e.g., Viscusi, Magat & Huber, 1991; Desaigues & Rabl, 1995). The side on which 
each option was presented, and the colours used to represent each probability were 
randomised.  
Figure 5. Example of Risky Pairwise Choice with Similar Objects 
 
The indifference probability for each SG scenario is the probability (p, q or r) of receiving the 
best payoff that makes respondents indifferent between the two prospects. These probabilities 
were used in order to compute the intermediate item’s utility elicited directly and indirectly.  
Indifference probabilities were elicited using an iterative procedure. The advantage of using 




questions required to reach a reasonably fine-grained indifference probability9. Our iterations 
began from one out of three starting probabilities (0.35, 0.50, and 0.65) determined at 
random10. Questions went on until the indifference probability range was narrowed down to 5 
percentage points, and then the middle point of the range is taken as the indifference 
probability.  
Figure 6. Example of an Iteration to Indifference with Starting Probability = 0.50 
 
An iteration starting from probability 0.50 could look like the example highlighted in Figure 6. 
The figure shows the upper half of a probability tree, which is a graphical representation of all 
the possible iteration paths from the starting probability up to indifference (see the full 
probability trees we used for the three starting probabilities in Appendix A.3). The letters are 
used to label nodes: each unique risky pairwise choice that participants can face on their 
iteration to their indifference probability in each of the gamble scenarios. The probabilities on 
the vertical axis of the figure correspond to the chances of receiving the best outcome in the 
choice in each node. 
                                                 
9 This comes at the expense of errors having possibly large repercussions. Once the respondent goes into 
one of the branches, it is not possible for them to go back and reach the other section of the tree. For 
example, choosing the sure prospect when one would actually prefer the risky one in node a (iteration 1) 
would lead to not being able to reach indifference probabilities ranging from 0 to 0.50.  We do not 
consider our results were greatly affected by this, if at all, because according to our attention check 
questions participants were paying attention and that should translate into few response errors (see 
Appendix A.5 for more details about attention checks).  




The iteration consists in determining the probabilities shown in one question depending on the 
respondent’s choice in the previous one. If the respondent chose the sure prospect, as the 
respondent in the example would have done in node a, that means that the probability of 
receiving the best payoff was not high enough for them to be indifferent between the prospects. 
In the next question, the probability would be increased, going to node b. If, on the other hand, 
the respondent chose the risky prospect, as in node b, that means that the probability of 
receiving the high payoff is high enough; in this case, the next question would have a lower 
probability (node d).  
Throughout the iteration, the probability in node a, 0.50, becomes the floor of the indifference 
range, and the probability in node j, 0.55, the ceiling. At that point, the distance between the 
floor and the ceiling is 5 percentage points, so the iteration ends. We take the middle point of 
that range, 0.575 in this case, as the indifference probability for that gamble scenario. In this 
example, the iteration to indifference took four questions, but it could take up to five questions, 
and that is why different participants could have a different total number of risky pairwise 
choices of interest, ranging from 48 to 60.  
In order to have a fixed number of questions (100) so that the incentive scheme was the same 
for everyone, we included filler questions. They were interspersed among the choices of 
interest, and were also used to conceal the iteration11, to add variety in the choices to keep 
respondents engaged, and to test other hypotheses elsewhere12.  
Respondents had incentives to reflect about their preferences and give truthful answers 
because at the end of the study one of these questions could be randomly selected to be played 
out for real. The question selected could be like the one in Figure 5. If the participant had chosen 
the sure prospect, then they would receive the payoff offered by it (in this example, a radio 
alarm clock). If they had chosen the risky prospect, the reward would be decided by taking a 
numbered ball out of an opaque bag. In this case, if the number on the ball was between 1 and 
16 inclusive, the respondent would receive the radio-speaker alarm clock; whereas if the 
number was between 17 and 20, the payoff would be the alarm clock. 
                                                 
11 A non-transparent iterative procedure was chosen over a transparent one because it has been shown 
that they elicit answers that are more consistent across elicitation techniques (particularly choice and 
matching). This has been found in the health domain (Pinto-Prades, Sánchez-Martínez, Abellán-Perpiñán  
& Martínez-Pérez, 2018) and others (e.g., hypothetical job offers as in the 1999 work by Fischer and 
colleagues), and money lotteries (Loomes & Pogrebna, 2016)). 
12 Some of these are reported in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Additional information about these questions 




The risky pairwise choice task was the last one of the study. Once it was over, each participant’s 
payment (in addition to a £3 show-up fee) could be determined. This would be either a money 
amount (which could go up to £50), one of the objects, or nothing, according to each 
respondent’s answer in a randomly selected decision. We divided the tasks in the study in 9 
blocks of approximately the same duration: 3 blocks of 25 riskless pairwise choices each, 1 block 
for the ranking task, 1 block for the valuation task, and 4 blocks of 25 risky pairwise choices each. 
The computer randomly chose 1 out of the 9 blocks, and respondents were paid out according 
to the incentive scheme of the selected task. Participants had been informed about the 
incentive structure before doing each task and completed test questions with feedback about 
it. 
2.3.2. Participants 
A total of 74 participants completed this study but some of them had to be excluded from the 
analysis. There were four exclusion criteria. First, a computer error during data collection 
affected 4 participants, who did not see all the questions or saw some of them from two to four 
times, so their answers were not usable. Second, 7 participants valued some objects at £0, and 
this made some of the questions impossible to analyse13. Third, 5 participants valued some 
objects above £50 and saw a pre-set money equivalent gamble rather than one with their actual 
money equivalents (see Appendix A.4); that means that their objects and money gamble 
scenarios were not comparable. The reason why we had the pre-set money gamble is that while 
respondents’ valuations could go to infinity, our budget could not. One of the choices each 
respondent made during the study was incentivised, and so we had to cap the reward that they 
could receive at £5014. Last, some of the filler gambles were designed to spot participants who 
were not paying attention, but we did not have to exclude any participants because of this (see 
more details about the attention checks in Appendix A.5).  
After excluding these participants, our sample of 74 was reduced to 58. Participants were 
university students, 21.9 years old on average, and 39 (67%) of them were female. They were 
invited to the study through the University of Warwick SONA online recruitment system, and 
came to the laboratory for an experimental session that lasted for an hour.  
                                                 
13 For instance, when there is a single object within the set valued at £0, then that object must be the 
worst one (C), given that we infer their ranking (A≻B≻C) from their valuation. If the worst object’s value 
equals £0, then gamble scenarios P and Q are the same, and gamble scenario R is a choice between 
nothing vs. a chance of nothing and a chance of the most preferred object. 





2.4.1. Valuation and Gambles Summary 
The following tables show the summary statistics of the money equivalents of the objects (Table 
1), and the cases in which each of the objects in the similar and dissimilar objects sets were 
ranked as the best, middle, and worst payoffs (Table 2).  
The first table offers reassurance about the success of the task in eliciting accurate valuations. 
While the most expensive objects are clustered in the top half of the table, and the cheapest 
ones are in the bottom, objects are not ordered by market price within the two halves (see what 
the objects prices were in Amazon when the object pool was piloted in Table 18 in Appendix 
A.1). In addition to market price considerations, valuations were sensitive (in the direction that 
one would expect) to the self-reported measures about the objects we collected in the 
familiarisation task. Summary statistics of these (participants’ desire to receive the objects, and 
whether they already owned such objects) can be found in Table 24 and Table 25 in Appendix 
A.6. First, valuations were positively correlated with the desire to receive the objects (𝜌  = 
0.5418, p-value < .01). Second, with regards to owning them already, valuations were 
significantly lower for those objects that participants owned than for those they did not own 
(meanown = £9.78, SDown = £8.29, meannot_own = £12.56, SDnot_own = £11.37, Wilcoxon rank-sum 
two-sided test p-value < .01).  
The second table lends credibility to our complexity manipulation: in the case of the similar 
objects, participants could generally distinguish the increasing features and placed additional 
value on them; with dissimilar objects, on the other hand, there was greater heterogeneity in 
people’s valuations, which might indicate that establishing an order of preference was not as 









Median Mean SD 
Suitcase £16.13 £18.57 £16.83  
Radio-speaker (RS) Alarm Clock £16.00 £19.59 £17.88 Similar 
Headphones £15.00 £18.44 £16.67  
Air Mattress £10.00 £15.20 £20.00 Dissimilar 
Radio Alarm Clock £9.75 £13.22 £12.23 Similar 
Toaster £7.50 £10.71 £10.94 Dissimilar 
Mouse £6.63 £8.24 £8.63  
Alarm Clock £5.50 £6.80 £7.85 Similar 
Bottle £5.00 £6.06 £7.47  
Clicker £4.63 £6.63 £8.66 Dissimilar 
 
Table 2. Object Ranking (n = 58) 
SIMILAR OBJECTS 
Best Middle Worst Cases 
RS Alarm Clock Radio Alarm Clock Alarm Clock 49 
RS Alarm Clock Alarm Clock Radio Alarm Clock 0 
Radio Alarm Clock RS Alarm Clock Alarm Clock 9 
Radio Alarm Clock Alarm Clock RS Alarm Clock 0 
Alarm Clock Radio Alarm Clock RS Alarm Clock 0 
Alarm Clock RS Alarm Clock Radio Alarm Clock 0 
DISSIMILAR OBJECTS 
Best Middle Worst Cases 
Air Mattress Toaster Clicker 20 
Air Mattress Clicker Toaster 11 
Toaster Air Mattress Clicker 18 
Toaster Clicker Air Mattress 1 
Clicker Toaster Air Mattress 3 
Clicker Air Mattress Toaster 5 
2.4.2. Consistency 
According to EUT, the utility of a prospect is given by the expectation of the utility of its payoffs. 
That is, subjective value is the only dimension of the payoff that should matter when making 
decisions. It also follows from the RCLA, and hence EUT, that the utility estimates obtained 
directly (equation (4)) and indirectly (equation (7)) should be the same. Thus, we should find 
consistency between the utility estimates elicited with different consequences (e.g., money vs. 
objects) for as long as they are equivalent in subjective value; and consistency between the 




In this study, in order to consider two estimates as consistent we did not require them to be 
identical (i.e., we did not require both sides of equation (8) to be exactly the same). The utilities 
were estimated by asking respondents to choose between prospects. These prospects offered 
payoffs associated with probabilities that ranged from 0 to 1, and varied in steps of 0.05. We 
accommodate a slight lack of sensitivity to probability changes and trembling hand errors15 by 
allowing for a 0.05 discrepancy in the estimates. This means that, for example, we would 
consider an estimate implied from an indifference probability between 0.35 and 0.40, and 
another estimate implied from a probability between 0.40 and 0.45 as consistent with each 
other. 
Before our main analysis, we ran an OLS regression (clustering errors by respondent) to check 
that the elements of the gambles design we randomized did not have an effect on the elicited 
indifference probabilities.  These factors were the probability from which the iteration started, 
the colours of the balls that were used to represent probabilities, and whether the risky 
alternative was shown on the right- or the left-hand side. None of these had a significant effect 
on indifference probabilities, so the data did not need to be analysed separately on the basis of 
these factors in our subsequent analysis. The regression output can be found in Appendix A.6. 
We opted for a within-subjects analysis. Previous valuation studies were aiming to estimate the 
societal value of health or physical risk reductions, and so they looked at the means and medians 
of the utility estimates. In this study, however, we are testing the validity of the RCLA in different 
domains, and aggregating the data could hide individual choice patterns that we care about.  
We start the analysis looking at the effect of the choice complexity manipulation by comparing 
the estimates elicited with objects and money. Next, we test the validity of the RCLA by 
comparing the estimates elicited directly and indirectly for money, similar and dissimilar objects. 
Consistency across types of goods: objects vs. money 
According to EUT, the comparability of the outcomes should not make a difference in choice; 
the only dimension of the outcomes that enters people decisions is their utility. If that were the 
case, we should not find any difference between the object and the money estimates.  
We classified the estimates from each of the three gamble scenarios into three groups: one in 
which the estimates elicited with money were smaller than the ones elicited with the equivalent 
                                                 
15 These refer to mistakes when answering the questions, which in this case could place participants in a 




object, one where they were consistent, and one for when the money estimate was higher than 
the object one. Table 3 shows the percentage and the frequency of the cases (out of 58) that 
fell in each of the groups. 
Table 3. Objects vs. Money Equivalents Estimates (n = 58) 






u(£) < u(Obj) u(£) ≈ u(Obj) u(£) > u(Obj) 
u(B)P 
Similar 14% (8) 36% (21) 50% (29) 
.7522 
Dissimilar  19% (11) 34% (20) 47% (27) 
u(B)Q 
Similar 19% (11) 24% (14) 57% (33) 
.0304 
Dissimilar  38% (22) 28% (16) 34% (20) 
u(C)R 
Similar 24% (14) 22% (13) 53% (31) 
.9725 
Dissimilar  24% (14) 21% (12) 55% (32) 
The difference between the money and objects estimates followed a pattern: the largest group 
for all gambles was almost always the one where the utilities elicited with money amounts were 
higher than their object counterparts. The exception to this was the u(B)Q estimate for the 
dissimilar objects, which we assume to be the hardest to make, as dissimilar objects are the 
most complex good in our study, and gamble scenario Q involved a choice between three 
objects (rather than two objects and ‘nothing’, like in the other two scenarios). This means that, 
generally, respondents were more averse to risk when the payoffs were money than when they 
were either of the two object types; that is, they required a higher probability of success (i.e., 
chance of receiving the best outcome) in order to be indifferent between the sure and the risky 
prospects. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests confirmed that the difference between the money and 
the objects utilities was statistically significant (i.e., rejected the null hypothesis of equal 
distributions between the objects and the money estimates) in all cases but the exception 
mentioned above (p-values < .05, see all the p-values, together with histograms of these 
differences in Appendix A.6).  
With the exception of u(B)Q, we found no difference in the patterns of objects and money 
estimates depending on whether the objects were similar or dissimilar to each other. Chi-
squared tests (see right column of Table 3) confirmed this at a 5% significance level. 
Our complexity manipulation provides evidence against the descriptive validity of EUT: our 
participants’ decisions were not exclusively influenced by the value of the gamble outcomes, 
but their nature mattered too. Even when respondents had stated that the given objects and 




involved the money amounts than when they involved the objects. That is, apart from the 
relative utilities of its outcomes, the SG captured respondents’ risk attitude towards them. 
There was a difference between money and objects, but within the objects we did not find a 
systematic effect of complexity on the estimates; whether the objects shared a fraction of their 
dimensions (similar objects) or not (dissimilar objects) generally did not make a difference. 
Consistency across types of estimates: direct vs. indirect 
We then turned to the consistency between the direct and indirect utility estimates. We pooled 
the money estimates together, as they were not different to each other in terms of complexity. 
The relation between respondents’ direct and indirect estimates falls in three groups, like the 
ones used in our previous analysis. Table 4 summarises the percentage and the number of cases 
in each category. We found consistency in about a third of the cases with each type of good (the 
percentage ranged from 31% to 38%). Consistency was roughly the same with money (the least 
complex good) and with dissimilar objects (the most complex one).  




 u(B)P < u(B)QR u(B)P ≈ u(B)QR u(B)P > u(B)QR 
Money 116 29% (34) 37% (43) 34% (39) 
Similar Objects 58 21% (12) 31% (18) 48% (28) 
Dissimilar Objects 58 40% (23) 38% (22) 22% (13) 
The gamble scenarios used to elicit the utility estimates did not only differ in whether they were 
chained or not. As we hypothesised, the complexity of the gamble outcomes may have had a 
systematic effect on consistency. Other factors such as the value of the outcomes, their relative 
ranking (i.e., which object was ranked as best, middle, and worst), and the probability at which 
the iteration to indifference started were not kept constant across gamble scenarios either. 
Hence, the disparities we found between the direct and indirect estimates may have been 
driven by the failure of the RCLA, but also by any of the previously mentioned factors. In the 
following sub-sections, we explored whether there was any systematic relation between these 
factors and the (in)consistency cases found. 
Effect of the type of good 
We had hypothesised that the smaller the fraction of dimensions the outcomes shared, the less 
consistency we would find. This implied that we would find the highest consistency with money, 





The percentage of consistency cases was about the same with money, similar and dissimilar 
objects (31-38%), but there were differences in the inconsistent cases across the goods. With 
our least complex good, money, the inconsistent cases were approximately evenly split between 
the two inconsistency groups. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (see p-values in Table 5) confirmed 
that the distributions of the direct and indirect money estimates were not significantly different 
with this good. Just like Chilton and Spencer did when they asked their respondents to estimate 
the utility of money, we found a few more cases where the direct estimate was higher than the 
indirect estimate, but this asymmetry was much less pronounced than the ones we found with 
objects. With objects, we found a statistically significant asymmetry in the distribution of the 
cases in the two categories other than consistency (see histograms in Table 5). In the case of the 
dissimilar objects, the largest group was the one where the indirect estimates were higher than 
the direct estimates. That is, the indirect estimates portrayed the worst object (or its money 
equivalent) as being worse than indicated by the direct estimate. With the similar objects, the 
opposite was true.  
Table 5. Differences in u(B) graphically: Direct - Indirect Estimates 
 



















The disparities between the direct and indirect estimates elicited with money were 




estimates surrounded by random noise. However, in the case of objects, the distribution of the 
disparities is skewed: to the right in the case of similar objects, and to the left in the case of 
dissimilar objects. 
Effect of other factors 
It may be the case that the patterns we observed were not only driven by the complexity of the 
goods, but also by the differences in their value. We looked at value differences for the 
consistent and inconsistent estimates (see Appendix A.6 for full analysis). We found that there 
were no significant differences in the value range (the difference between the monetary 
equivalents of the best and the worst objects), or the money equivalent of the best possible 
payoff for the consistent and the inconsistent cases. This indicates that the differences in the 
subjective value of the payoffs could not have had an effect on the (in)consistency patterns 
found. 
Last, we looked at the two other factors that varied across the gamble scenarios: the starting 
probabilities (0.35, 0.50, and 0.65), which had been randomly assigned to each set, and the 
relative ranking of the objects, which would determine in which of the prospects each payoff 
would appear. We had found the starting probabilities were not significantly related to the 
indifference probabilities, but they might still have had some effect on consistency. We ran Chi-
squared tests to check whether there was a statistically significant relation between consistency 
and the starting probabilities of the three gamble scenarios in each group. We could not reject 
the null hypothesis of no relation (all p-values >0.10). We also used Chi-squared tests to see 
whether consistency was associated to the different possible combinations of objects (the ones 
shown in Table 2), and the relationship was not statistically significant for the similar objects (p-
value = .503) or the dissimilar objects (p-value = .122). 
2.5. Discussion 
We set out to examine whether disparities between the direct and indirect SG utility estimates 
are caused by the elicitation context or the lack of validity of the RCLA. We modified the context 
to try to minimise its effect on consistency and observe whether the RCLA held. We shifted away 
from the affective and abstract nature of health, and the effect of the lack of incentives on 
consistency; and we manipulated the complexity of the choices.  
If the RCLA held, and our hypothesis were true, then having removed the effect of affect, and 
providing incentives in the lowest complexity treatment (i.e., when valuing monetary amounts), 




rates that ranged from 31% to 38% across the three types of goods. With the simplest possible 
context we could set up (i.e., money amounts valuation), more than 6 in 10 cases were not 
consistent. Having removed the effect of some contextual factors, we found no effect of the 
factors that varied across gamble scenarios, which suggest that the reason why the disparities 
occur is the failure of RCLA, rather than context.  
Had we not found systematic disparities between the direct and indirect SG estimates, our 
findings would have provided grounds to tentatively attribute the disparities previously found 
in health to contextual factors. In this case, further work would be needed to identify the role 
that each of the factors that we removed or manipulated may play in reducing the disparities. 
This could be done with the current study design by bringing back the elements we removed 
one by one. First, we would run the same study without incentives, and then, without incentives 
and with health rather than consumer goods. This output would then help to improve the design 
of health valuation studies in order to minimise the disparities. Our findings point in the 
opposite direction, to the lack of descriptive validity of the RCLA.  We leave it for others to judge 
whether using an instrument with an overall rate of inconsistencies of 64% across goods is 
appropriate for policy purposes.  
Turning to our complexity manipulation, its goal was two-fold. First, we used it to test the EUT 
prediction that the only dimension of outcomes that enters people’s decisions is subjective 
value (or utility). We asked questions involving prospects that were identical in terms of 
probabilities and the subjective value of the payoffs, but varied in the comparability of the latter: 
in the more complex case, the outcomes were objects, and in the less complex case, they were 
money amounts. If the EUT premise held, then we should expect to elicit the same estimates. 
We looked at the difference in estimates for each of the three gamble scenarios individually. 
We found that in most cases the estimates elicited with the monetary equivalents of the objects 
were higher than those elicited with the objects. That is, participants were more risk averse with 
money than with objects, and this was reflected in the utility estimates. This might be because 
of the complexity of the choices, or because of their nature (e.g., money is fungible, but objects 
are not); further research is needed to address this question.  
Second, we explored the effect of choice complexity on consistency between the direct and 
indirect SG utilities. We had hypothesised that the smaller the fraction of shared dimensions 
among the outcomes, the less consistency there would be. We found that this was not the case: 
the rates of consistency in the money and objects gambles were very close, and so were those 




of outcomes was the pattern of the inconsistent cases: while the inconsistent cases with money 
were approximately evenly split between the two inconsistency groups (one where the direct 
estimates were higher than the indirect estimates, and the other way around), we found 
different patterns for the two types of objects. We replicated the asymmetry that is usually 
found in studies with comparable designs to ours when valuing health (the indirect estimate is 
higher than the direct) with the dissimilar objects and found an asymmetry in the opposite 
direction for similar objects. This further supports our complexity manipulation, as the patterns 
we found with the most complex choices in our study (i.e., those with dissimilar objects) were 
the same as those in choices involving health. 
In sum, our findings contribute to the existing literature on the descriptive validity of EUT and 
the RCLA, the SG method, and decision making across domains. To our best knowledge, this is 
the first study where the descriptive validity of the RCLA is refuted with a (probability) 
equivalence task, in a non-monetary domain, under incentive compatibility. We also uncovered 
an asymmetry in the direction of the disparities between the utility estimates elicited directly 
and indirectly depending on whether the objects shared some of their attributes (similar 
objects) or they did not (dissimilar objects). Further exploring the reasons behind this pattern 
may shed light on how the fraction of shared dimensions among the outcomes affects people’s 
decisions, and whether it has a systematic and robust effect.  
In addition to this, our results show that using monetary outcomes as a proxy for other types of 
outcomes could lead to the wrong inferences, as outcome dimensions other than subjective 
value, and their comparability thanks to having (or not) dimensions in common, also appear to 
influence people’s decisions. This is a particularly relevant finding for experimental economists 
who, on the basis of our findings, should not automatically assume that the predictions of 
models developed and tested with one good will also hold with other types of goods. We found 











Chapter 3.                                                                                                    
Exploring the Role of Choice Complexity through                                           





The common ratio effect (Allais, 1953; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is a violation of expected 
utility theory (EUT) widely replicated with monetary consequences. However, many of our day-
to-day decisions are more complex than the trade-offs between two unidimensional scales 
(money and probability) participants make in the lab, i.e., they may involve outcomes whose 
dimensions or attributes are not shared. Neither EUT nor any of its most prominent alternatives 
predict choice complexity to have an effect on decisions, but it is crucial to find out more about 
it since a lot of decision making models are developed using evidence from choices between 
monetary payoffs, but generalised to decision making with all outcomes. We aim to find out 
more about the role of choice complexity on decision making. Our design allows us to compare 
(incentivised) choice patterns in questions that differ in complexity: the outcomes were either 
money or consumer goods, which had identical probabilities and equivalent subjective value. 
We replicated the common ratio effect with money. With objects, however, we did not find it: 
the deviations from consistency went in the CRE direction, but the asymmetry between them 
was not statistically significant. The greater consistency found with objects may be caused, 
rather than by the descriptive validity of EUT, by participants resorting to heuristics (such as 
‘always pick the prospect that offers the best payoff’) when decisions are too complex. These 
results suggest that preferences and attitudes may be domain-specific, and so that using money 
to proxy decisions with other outcomes may lead to wrong inferences.  
 







Expected utility theory (EUT) is an influential theory of decision making under risk that 
postulates that the expected utility of a prospect is given by the utility of its payoffs, weighted 
by their respective probabilities. Its axiomatic base was developed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944), and while these axioms are normatively appealing (Machina, 1982), there 
is a large body of research that questions their descriptive validity. This evidence comes from 
fields such as psychology and behavioural economics, which, in the light of evidence contrary to 
EUT, have provided alternative descriptive models of risky choice (see Starmer, 2000; Sudgen, 
2004; Fox, Erner & Walters, 2015).  
One of the most famous violations of EUT is the common ratio effect (CRE), which was put 
forward by Allais (1953) and popularised by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as evidence that 
actual behaviour deviates systematically from the implications of EUT. The best-known form of 
the phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 7. The CRE involves two questions, scaled-up and scaled-
down, with two prospects each: S and R, and S’ and R’ respectively. In these prospects, there 
are two possible consequences: cl, which has lower utility, and ch, with higher utility, such that 
ch ≻ cl ≻ 0. The consequences are the same in both questions, and so is the ratio of the 
probabilities of receiving these consequences. This common probability ratio is achieved by 
scaling down the probabilities of the better outcomes in the scaled-up question by the same 
factor (in this example, by 4). 
 
Scaled-up question: S = (cl, 1)*  R = (ch, 0.80; 0, 0.20) 
Scaled-down question: S’ = (cl, 0.25; 0, 0.75) R’ = (ch, 0.20; 0, 0.80)* 
 Note. The stars indicate which prospect is chosen more often. 
According to EUT, in the absence of error (or noise), the choices in the scaled-up question should 
be the same as those in the scaled-down question. That is, individuals who choose prospect S 
(R) in the scaled-up question should choose S’ (R’) in the scaled-down question. However, it is 
often found that in the scaled-up question, the safe prospect S is preferred to the risky one R; 
but in the scaled-down question, when the probabilities of the nonzero outcomes are scaled 
down by the same factor, the riskier prospect R’ is preferred to the safer one S’. This choice 
 




pattern is robust and, if made by the same individual, it cannot be explained by a deterministic 
set of EUT preferences16.  
The CRE is probably the most frequently replicated violation of EUT (Loomes & Sudgen, 1998). 
In most cases, replications are done following the experimental economics tradition of using 
money as outcomes. In the most popular variation of the problem, which we refer to as the 
classic CRE, the consequences are money amounts with a ¾ value ratio (e.g., 3,000 and 4,000 
Israeli shekels, or 30 and 40 US dollars or British pounds). Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
argued for using monetary consequences as a way of simplifying decisions when testing models, 
assuming that money is “divisible, and substitutable, freely transferable and identical […] with 
whatever ‘satisfaction’ or ‘utility’ is desired by each participant” (1944, p. 8). However, this may 
not suffice when pursuing a broader descriptive account of behaviour. People’s everyday 
decisions involve complex, multi-faceted consequences (rather than simpler, unidimensional 
ones as money). Therefore, models built on evidence solely from choices involving monetary 
amounts may fail to capture the nuances of actual decision making.  
EUT predictions for money and for other consequences are not different. When laying down the 
concept of numerical utility, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) prompted the reader to 
imagine prospects where the consequences were “any two objects or […] events” (p. 17), 
implying that their EUT axioms should hold regardless of whether the outcomes were money 
amounts, objects, or events. After them, Savage (1954) used omelettes as examples of 
consequences, and Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 264) stated that “the domain of the [EUT] 
utility function is not limited to any particular class of consequences”. However, EUT assumes 
that decisions are only influenced by the utility or subjective value of the consequences and the 
probabilities associated with them. Hence, it does not allow for the complexity that different 
consequences bring into choices to have any effect.  
In this study, we aim to explore the role that choice complexity may play in decision making. 
Choice complexity is defined, as in the previous chapter of this thesis (see page 16), on the basis 
of how easy it is to compare the consequences’ dimensions. The higher the fraction of 
                                                 
16 The choice of prospect S over R implies that u(cl) / u(ch) > 0.80, whereas the choice of prospect R’ over 
S’ implies the opposite, that u(cl) / u(ch) < 0.80. Given that the consequences and the ratio of probabilities 
are the same across questions, these choices constitute a violation of the independence axiom. In its 
generic form, this axiom implies that for prospects S, R, X, if prospect S is preferred to prospect R, then 
any probability mixing of prospect S with another prospect X should also be preferred to the same 
probability mixing with prospect R. In the case of the CRE, the prospects in the scaled-down question 
originate from mixing those in the scaled-up question with prospect X, which is a 0.75 probability of 




comparable dimensions, the less complex, in relative terms, the choice will be. Following this 
definition, choices between money amounts are the simpler ones, while choices that involve 
two different objects (e.g., a coffee machine and a pair of jeans) are more complex, and hence 
more difficult to make. 
Our design allows us to match the utility of each consumer good with that of a money amount, 
for every participant. To our best knowledge, this is the first fully incentive compatible study to 
do so. Using the CRE paradigm with monetary consequences as a benchmark, we manipulate 
choice complexity by asking participants to make choices between prospects with consumer 
goods as payoffs. In order to isolate this effect, we keep the probabilities of receiving each 
consequence constant, and compare the choice patterns with objects and money amounts that 
participants deemed equivalent in utility terms.  
We replicated the CRE when the consequences were monetary, but not when they were objects. 
This evidence contradicts the implicit assumption of EUT formulation that choice complexity 
does not influence decisions. The absence of the CRE with objects suggests that, with these 
goods, participants did behave as expected utility maximisers. Alternatively, this pattern could 
arise if respondents resorted to heuristics (such as “choose the prospect with the better 
outcome”) when it was difficult to compare the consequences. The use of these heuristics when 
choices were complex may have led to greater consistency with objects compared to money, 
and yet not be evidence in favour of EUT.  
In section 2, we discuss the relevant literature. In section 3, we present the design of our study, 
and in section 4, our results. We conclude with a discussion of our findings in section 5.  
3.2. Theoretical Background 
The CRE fostered the development of a large number of alternative models that account for the 
observed preference switch. The most prominent of these, and currently the dominant 
behavioural models (Fox, Erner & Walters, 2015), are prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) and its later formulation, cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
In CPT, the utility function is replaced by a value function that encompasses all types of 
consequences, and cumulative probabilities non-linearly weighed replace the objective ones. 





Neither EUT nor CPT make different predictions depending on the complexity of the choice. The 
only aspects that these theories predict to influence decisions are the subjective value (or utility) 
of the consequences and their (possibly weighted) probabilities. Irrespective of the complexity 
of the decision (i.e., the comparability of the consequences), EUT cannot account for the CRE. 
On the other hand, CPT does account for the CRE. In either case, as long as the consequences 
are equivalent in terms of utility, and given that the probabilities are the same and are weighted 
in the same order, different choice complexity should not result in different choice patterns. 
Although CRE replications with monetary outcomes are abundant, to the best of our knowledge 
there are only two studies that have tested this effect with more complex consequences than 
money. In both cases, the CRE was replicated. First, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) report 
hypothetical choices between a 50% chance of winning a 3-week tour of England, France and 
Italy, versus a 1-week tour of England for sure, and the scaled-down version of the question 
where probabilities of nonzero outcomes were reduced by a factor of 10. The switch from the 
safe to the risky prospects was also replicated then, with 78% of participants choosing the safe 
option in the scaled-up question, and 67% of participants choosing the risky option in the scaled-
down question.  
Second, Robin Keller (1985b) tested the CRE using three different ways of presenting the 
probabilities: written statements, matrices where cell size was proportional to probabilities, and 
graphically with pictures of marble tubes. She found the effect for all three presentation modes. 
She used a Porsche car as the better payoff of the pair, and a convertible Volkswagen as the 
worse one; both of them were hypothetical rewards. The probabilities she used were not the 
classic ones. She used 4 different probability pairs and combined them into three sets of scaled-
up and -down questions. She used 100% and 75% for the scaled-up question in the first two 
sets. For the scaled-down questions, she reduced these by a factor of 25 (to 4% and 3%) in the 
first set, and a factor of 1.25 (to 80% and 60%) in the second set. In her third set, she used the 
80% and 60% chances in the scaled-up question, and scaled them down by a factor of 20 (to 4 
and 3%).  
These two studies tested the CRE with non-monetary consequences. Despite the choices they 
asked participants to make were more complex than those that involve monetary consequences 
only, these decisions were far from many of those that people typically make in the following 
two respects. First, they were not incentivised, but decisions people make in their daily lives 
have real consequences. Second, they involved consequences that were relatively 




consider the longer holiday with more destinations better than the shorter, 1-destination trip; 
and that a Porsche would generally be preferred to a Volkswagen. But many of the decisions 
that people make involve difficult trade-offs. 
With this study, we expand the limited existing empirical work by tackling these two issues. First, 
we move from hypothetical to incentive compatible questions. Second, we ask questions that 
involve trade-offs between familiar consumer goods. We are able to isolate the effect of choice 
complexity by comparing the choices participants make in the money and the objects questions, 
while keeping everything else (i.e., the probabilities and the subjective value of the 
consequences) constant.  To our best knowledge, this is the first fully incentive compatible study 
to do so. Within the objects, we further manipulate complexity. The so-called similar objects in 
our study have some comparable features, and hence we presume that people will regard the 
objects with additional features as better. The dissimilar objects, on the other hand, do not have 
comparable features and hence establishing a preference ordering should be more difficult; this 
is closer to what may happen with choices outside of the laboratory. 
We aim to find out whether the CRE persists with consumer goods. This will allow us to test the 
descriptive validity of EUT using non-monetary consequences. Bust most importantly, it will let 
us explore the differences in choice patterns that arise as we move from decisions involving 
monetary consequences to more complex non-monetary ones. For the same purpose, we also 
compare choice patterns between similar and dissimilar objects.  
EUT and CPT imply that the mechanisms behind simpler and more complex decisions are the 
same, and so that we should expect that whatever choice pattern is found for monetary 
outcomes should also be found in more complex choices, as long as the subjective value of the 
consequences and their (possibly weighted) probabilities are the same. Intuitively, deciding 
between outcomes that cannot be compared using the same measuring stick seems more 





3.3.1. Design and Procedure17 
In order to explore the role of outcome complexity, we elicit respondents’ monetary equivalents 
of the objects. Then, we compare their choices in CRE-type questions when the consequences 
are objects, and when they are the money amount each respondent indicated is equivalent to 
the objects in terms of subjective value.  
The study was conducted at the University of Warwick. First, we familiarised participants with 
the objects in the study. Second, we elicited the monetary equivalents (or valuations) for each 
object by means of three tasks: riskless pairwise choices, a ranking, and a valuation grid. We 
used each participant’s valuations to decide which objects to include in their CRE questions, and 
to substitute those objects when the consequences were money. Last, we asked the CRE 
questions. 
Familiarisation 
There were 10 objects in this study (see Figure 8). They were on display at the laboratory and 
participants were encouraged to have a look at them before the session started. Within these 
objects, there were 3 that shared some attributes (‘similar objects’): three alarm clocks, one of 
which also had a radio, and a third one that had a radio and Bluetooth speakers. Within the 
similar goods, there were dominance relationships that should be straightforward to identify 
for most participants. For example, we would expect them to regard the radio alarm clock as 
more valuable than the alarm clock, given that it had the same alarm feature but also a radio. 
The remaining objects did not share any feature with each other or the alarm clocks. Hence, we 
expected it to be harder to establish an order of preference where the objects clearly dominated 
one another. 
                                                 
17 The data used in this chapter come from the same experiment used to collect the data for the previous 
chapter. A detailed explanation of the design and procedure for this study was included here to fulfil the 
requirement that each of the chapters should resemble a stand-alone paper, but readers who have 




Figure 8. Consumer Goods in this Study 
 
The study started with the object familiarization task, where participants saw a screen per object 
with a picture of it and a brief description. The information about the characteristics of the 
objects was available for the participants throughout the study: they had printed cards with it, 
and they could also see it on the screen by clicking on the image of the object at any time. To 
ensure that participants spent some time considering each object, we asked them whether they 
already owned such an object, and how much they would like to receive it (on a 7-point scale 
going from “not at all” to “very much”).  
Elicitation of the Monetary Equivalents 
The monetary equivalents were elicited using three tasks, each of which gave participants 
further chances to reflect about their preferences. This was crucial for our study, as we needed 
participants’ valuations to be as accurate as possible. First, in the riskless pairwise choice task, 
participants were asked to make 75 choices between all the possible pairwise combinations of 
the 10 objects with each other and with each of three money amounts (£5.25, £8.75, £19.50). 
These money amounts were included to prompt respondents to start thinking about trade-offs 
between money and the objects, as they would have to do on a later task. Participants had 
incentives to make each of these choices carefully because at the end of the study, one of them 
could be randomly selected to be paid out, in which case participants would receive the item 
they said they preferred.  
Based on their answers to the pairwise choice questions, a provisional ranking of preference 
was inferred, and participants were invited to adjust it to better represent their preferences if 
necessary. Once again, they had incentives to do this accurately, because if this task was 
randomly chosen to be the basis of their payment, two items in the ranking (out of the 10 objects 
and the 3 money amounts) would be randomly selected and they would receive the one that 
they ranked higher. 
Once the ranking was submitted, they moved on to the valuation grid task. Their ranking 
appeared on the screen again, and this time participants had to drag and drop each item to the 




amounts in the ladder started at £0 and increased in £0.25 intervals, but the ladder had no 
endpoint. For example, if according to one participant the headphones had the same value as 
£19.25, that participant would drag the headphones picture to the cell with the “£19.25” label 
(as you can see in Figure 9).  
Figure 9. Detail of the Valuation Interface 
 
These monetary equivalents were used to decide which 4 out of the 10 objects would appear 
on the CRE questions.  
CRE Questions 
Last, participants answered 10 CRE questions (see an example in Figure 10). They were 
embedded in a larger set of questions that were part of a study with different goals18, and 
appeared in random order. 
Figure 10. Interface Sample of Scaled-up Question 
 
                                                 




We use ‘set’ to jointly refer to the scaled-up and scaled-down questions that feature a given 
pair of consequences. There were 5 different payoff pairs (2 featuring objects, and 3 with 
money), and each pair was shown in two questions that differed in their probabilities. Table 6 
summarises the pairs of consequences in the five sets. The payoffs of the classic CRE set were 
the usual £30 and £40, whose value ratio is ¾. The second set featured similar objects (two 
alarm clocks). The payoffs in the third set were the money amounts that each participant stated 
were equivalent in value to the similar objects in the second set. The fourth set featured two 
dissimilar objects (any two objects from the pool as long as they were not both alarm clocks), 
and the fifth set, their money equivalents. The pairs of objects were selected so that they were 
all as close as possible to the ¾ value ratio in order to make the sets as comparable as possible 
across consequence domains. Therefore, participants were liable to see different objects than 
one another, and also different monetary payoffs (other than for the classic CRE, where 
everybody saw £30 and £40). 
Table 6. Consequence Pairs 
SET  PAYOFFS 
1. Classic Common Ratio Effect  £30 and £40 
2. Similar Objects  2 out of: 
- Alarm Clock  
- Radio Alarm Clock  
- Radio-speaker Alarm Clock  
3. Money Equivalent (ME) of Similar Objects  Monetary Equivalents of the similar objects 
4. Dissimilar Objects  2 out of: 
- Alarm Clock  
- Radio Alarm Clock 




- Air mattress 
- Mouse 
- Clicker 
- Bottle  
  but not two of the alarm clocks 
5. Money Equivalent of Dissimilar Objects  Monetary Equivalents of the dissimilar objects 
 
3.3.2. Participants 
Respondents in this study were students recruited through the University of Warwick SONA 
participant recruitment system. In exchange for their participation, they received a show-up fee 
of £3 and an additional payoff. This payoff was either a money amount (which could go up to 
£50), one of the objects, or nothing, according to each respondent’s answer in a randomly 




in the analysis because their similar or dissimilar objects ratio closest to the target one (¾) was 
1. Such ratio implied that they had given both objects in the pair the same value, and hence the 
questions they faced were dominance questions (i.e., choices between prospects offering 
consequences with the exact same subjective value, one of which had a larger probability 
associated to it). The remaining 60 participants were 21.75 years old on average (SD = 2.61), and 
40 (67%) of them were females. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Question Payoffs 
Table 7 shows the object pairs that appeared in the CRE questions. The objects in the columns 
correspond to the consequence with the higher value (ch), and those in the rows correspond to 
the consequence with the lower value (cl). Each cell contains the count of the times that the pair 
of objects was shown. The light blue cells correspond to the similar objects. 
Table 7. Pairs of Objects Displayed 
 
For the similar objects pair there was not much room for variation as there were only 3 objects 
to choose from. There were 6 possible combinations that featured these 3 objects either as cl 
or ch (e.g., the alarm clock as cl and the radio alarm clock as ch; or the opposite, the alarm clock 
as ch and the radio alarm clock as cl). The two most common combinations were the radio-
speaker alarm clock as the better object, paired with the radio alarm clock (38% of the pairs 




confirms our assumptions that participants would be able to establish an ordering of preference, 
giving a higher value to the alarm clocks with additional features. For most participants, the 
radio-speaker alarm clock was more valuable than the other two clocks, and the radio alarm 
clock was better than the simple alarm clock.  
In the dissimilar objects pair there was much more diversity. Only about half of the possible 
combinations of objects were displayed, but that adds up to 45 different pairs. The most 
common combinations were shown 5 times (6% of the time) and had the headphones as the 
better consequence, and the radio alarm clock as the worse consequence; or 3 times (3.5% of 
the time) and featured the headphones and the radio-speaker alarm clock, the toaster and the 
mouse, and the mouse and the bottle.  
Regarding the value ratios, we were aiming for a 0.75 (¾) ratio, and the mean of the actual ratios 
for the similar and dissimilar objects was 0.73 and 0.76 respectively. However, because there 
was a limited pool of objects to choose from, the actual payoff ratios for every pair of objects 
were not always close to ¾ (see their distributions in Figure 11). Deviations from the ¾ ratio are 
more extreme for the similar objects.  
Figure 11. Distribution of the Actual Ratios: Similar vs. Dissimilar Objects (n=60) 
 
 
3.4.2. Choice Patterns 
First, we looked at the effect of our complexity manipulation by comparing the choices people 
made in the object sets to those they made when the consequences were money amounts. 
Within the object sets, we looked at whether choice patterns differed depending on whether 
the objects have some dimensions in common (similar objects) or rather their dimensions were 
distinctive (dissimilar objects). Second, we tested whether the classic CRE with monetary payoffs 




We start the section with an overview of the choice patterns. EUT predicts consistency in 
people’s choices in the scaled-up and the scaled-down questions. That is, either an S-S’ or a R-
R’ choice pattern. But just like in many other studies, a substantial share of our participants 
made different choices in the two questions. There are two types of reversals: the CRE (S-R’), in 
which participants choose the safe prospect in the scaled-up question, and the risky prospect in 
the scaled-down question; and the reverse CRE (R-S’), with the opposite choice pattern. See 
Figure 12 below for a summary of the choice patterns observed. 
Figure 12. Percentage of Choice Patterns per Set 
 
We found more preference switches in the money sets than in their object counterparts; that 
is, there was more consistency with objects than with money. Leaving consistency cases aside, 
the direction of the preference switches was the same for both goods: there were more CRE-
type reversals than the opposite type for both money and objects. However, the asymmetry 
between these two types of switches was smaller in the object sets compared to the money 
sets.  
A more detailed account of respondents’ choice patterns in the scaled-up and scaled-down 
questions in each set is provided in Table 8. Choices in the scaled-up questions (S and R 
prospects) are shown in the rows, and choices in the scaled-down questions (S’ and R’ 
prospects), in the columns. The intersections of the rows and the columns show how many 
participants followed each of the four choice patterns in a given set. Two of these patterns 
correspond to consistent preferences (S-S’ and R-R’), and the other two, to a preference switch 
– either the CRE or the reverse CRE. The numbers in bold on the diagonal indicate the number 
of people whose choices deviate from consistency, and the cells highlighted in grey correspond 
to the classic CRE choice pattern. The numbers in brackets next to the set name correspond to 
the number of the two types of deviations from consistency: first, the CRE, and second, the 





































reverse CRE. We used McNemar’s Chi-squared tests19 to assess whether these deviations were 
random20 or systematic. 
Table 8. Detail of Choice Patterns per Set 
      1. Classic Common Ratio Effect (23:5) 
        Scaled-down  
        S’ R’ TOTAL 
      Scaled-
up 
S 27 23 50 
      R 5 5 10 
       TOTAL 32 28 60 
      McNemar’s Chi Square Test: p-value < .01 
           
2. Similar Objects (14:6)  3. ME of Similar Objects (19:2) 
  Scaled-down     Scaled-down  
  S’ R’ TOTAL    S’ R’ TOTAL 
Scaled-
up 
S 13 14 27  Scaled-
up 
S 25 19 44 
R 6 27 33  R 2 14 16 
 TOTAL 19 41 60   TOTAL 27 33 60 
McNemar’s Chi Square Test: p-value = .1175  McNemar’s Chi Square Test: p-value < .01 
           
4. Dissimilar Objects (9:4)  5. ME of Dissimilar Objects (30:4) 
  Scaled-down     Scaled-down  
  S’ R’ TOTAL    S’ R’ TOTAL 
Scaled-
up 
S 23 9 32  Scaled-
up 
S 15 30 45 
R 4 24 28  R 4 11 15 
 TOTAL 27 33 60   TOTAL 19 41 60 
McNemar’s Chi Square Test: p-value = .2673  McNemar’s Chi Square Test: p-value < .01 
  
The left half of the figure displays the objects sets, and the right half shows their counterparts, 
where the consequences were the objects’ monetary equivalents. According to EUT and 
alternative models such as CPT, the right and the left sections of the figure should match, given 
that the probabilities in the prospects, and the subjective values of their consequences (as 
stated by each participant) were the same. However, that was not what we found. The classic 
CRE, with £30 and £40 payoffs, was replicated. This effect (i.e., the asymmetry between the 
                                                 
19 The p-values reported in Table 8 were computed using a continuity correction. The significance of the 
tests does not change without the continuity correction or with an exact version of the test (Fay, 2011) 
ran using the “exact2x2” R package. It is worth noting that in the case of the similar objects set, the p-
value without continuity correction drops to .0736. However, we consider this irrelevant as our 
significance threshold is α = .05. The difference in p-values between the similar and dissimilar objects sets 
(.1175 vs. .2673) cannot be explained by value differences between the outcomes in the pair, differences 
in the deviation from the target ratio, or differences in preference confidence – see summary statistics of 
these metrics and statistical tests in Table 31, Table 32 and Table 33 in Appendix B. 
20 The use of McNemar’s Chi-squared test to determine whether the CRE is systematic or the deviations 
from consistency are random is well-established (see Moffatt, 2015). It is worth noting that this test 
underlies the assumption that if the CRE was caused by noise, deviations from consistency would be 




number of preference switches, with more of the SR’ kind) persisted for the other money sets, 
but its statistical significance disappeared for the objects sets. In isolation, the choice patterns 
observed when the consequences were objects could be taken as evidence of the validity of 
EUT. However, because we did observe preference shifts with money, we cannot claim our 
results support the validity of this theory. Most importantly, our results indicate that choice 
complexity, induced by whether the consequences were money amounts or objects, did have 
an effect on choice patterns.  
3.5. Discussion  
EUT and alternative models such as CPT predict that as long as the subjective value of the 
consequences offered by the prospects, and their (weighted) probabilities are the same, then 
respondents’ choice patterns should also be the same regardless of how complex the choice is. 
In this study, we set out to explore, under full incentive compatibility, whether the complexity 
of the choice, brought by the comparability of the consequences, would also influence decisions. 
We elicited participants’ money equivalents for 10 objects as carefully as possible, refining them 
through several different tasks. We then asked participants to make choices under risk with the 
objects as outcomes, and the same questions but with the monetary equivalents participants 
had stated instead. We found that choice patterns were different with monetary and non-
monetary payoffs (i.e., consumer goods) that they had stated were equivalent. This evidence 
suggests that it is not only the subjective value of the consequence what enters people’s 
decisions.  
We replicated the classic CRE and also found this reversal with monetary payoffs, even when 
the amounts did not have an exact ¾ value ratio. However, when the CRE questions were made 
incentive compatible and involved payoffs that are difficult to compare to each other, we found 
that the established CRE was greatly attenuated. The choice patterns that we found with objects 
are closer to those predicted by EUT axioms than the ones we found with money, yet this cannot 
be taken as evidence of the descriptive validity of EUT, as participants did not behave as 
expected utility maximisers with monetary outcomes. In fact, these results might be pointing 
out a void in the decision making models literature, which fails to explicitly account for the effect 
of the (un)comparability of the consequences dimensions. The need to include features that 
increase the complexity of choices in models of decision making has been highlighted in previous 




A possible explanation for these choice patterns is that respondents resorted to heuristics (such 
as “choose the prospect with the preferred outcome, regardless of its probability”) when 
comparing the consequences was too hard. This rationale is consistent with literature that 
suggests that when decisions are too difficult to make, people use heuristics - see, for example, 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), or Camerer (2003). One way of simplifying decisions is “by 
ignoring some potentially relevant information and by avoiding trade-offs among values” 
(Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988, p. 3). In line with the previous statement and closely related 
to our results, Payne (1976) found evidence that increased decision complexity resulted in 
respondents using heuristics to reduce cognitive strain.  
Comparing multi-dimensional goods such as everyday objects may be harder than comparing 
money amounts, which are unidimensional and have cardinal properties. When confronted with 
a choice involving two objects, respondents may have been able to tell which object was better, 
but not how much better it was. This would have made trading off the subjective value of the 
consequences with the probability of receiving them very difficult, leading respondents to make 
their decisions on the basis of heuristics instead. In the scaled-up question, which is arguably 
the hardest out of the two (as the prospects differ in both the outcome and the probability 
dimensions), the choice patterns we observed are consistent with the use of the heuristic 
mentioned above. Respondents were more likely to choose the risky prospect in this question 
when the payoffs were objects than when they were money. The CRE involves choosing the safe 
prospect in the scaled-up question, and because that happened much less with objects, there 
was less room for the CRE to take place with objects compared to money. This might explain the 
difference in choice patterns between the objects and money sets, and why the CRE was found 
for the latter and not for the former.  
With regards to the complexity manipulation within the objects, we found no evidence that 
choices between the similar objects and their money equivalents were more consistent than 
those between the dissimilar objects and their money counterparts. However, we did find more 
consistent cases with the dissimilar objects than with the similar objects (40 vs. 47 out of 60). 
The consistency we observed, once again, may have been a result of complexity, which made 
making respondents resort to heuristics.  
To conclude, the findings from this study support the claim that preferences and attitudes are 
domain-specific: our participants made different choices when the consequences were money 
than when they were objects, even though they had indicated the two were equivalent. This 




laboratory experiments, and the validity of money questions to represent real life decisions. 
These findings also provide empirical support to the notion that outcome domain may influence 










Chapter 4.                                                                                                             
The Efficiency-Equity Trade-off, Self-Interest, and Moral Principles           





Governments attempt to respect public preferences when making trade-offs between policy 
options. Yet most estimates of the value of health and safety reflect only individuals’ self-
interested preferences. This approach may neglect or misrepresent individuals’ preferences 
over the distribution of public resources (for a review, see Guth and Kocher, 2014). We conduct 
an experiment in which participants rate and choose between policy options that differ in terms 
of their efficiency (expected number of lives a policy would save or the cases of ill health it would 
prevent) and their equity (balance of risk reductions for different parts of the population). 
Participants considered several interventions to clean up a hypothetical city’s water supply. 
Different options would reduce the risk of death or ill health for people in different areas of the 
city, and the size of the risk reduction varied across options. In order to see whether personally 
benefitting from the risk reduction would affect this trade-off, we told half of the sample to 
imagine that they lived in a specified area of the city. Our results suggest that efficiency is the 
most important factor in determining which policy option is preferred, but participants were 
almost as influenced by equity as by efficiency. When participants were included in the 
scenarios, they were influenced by efficiency in the area where they (hypothetically) lived, 
favouring policies that particularly benefitted them. However, the effect of self-interest was 
smaller than that of the general concern for efficiency. Our findings suggest that preferences for 
efficiency and equity are not substantially affected by self-interest, and contribute to the 
growing evidence that the number of people helped is not all that matters to decision makers 
evaluating health interventions. 
 







When deciding how to allocate resources to maximise societal welfare, difficult trade-offs are 
inevitable. Should resources be spent on education or on healthcare? Are some health 
improvements more valuable than others? Such illustrative trade-offs involve weighing benefits 
and costs of different magnitudes, at different times, and to different recipients.  
Governments attempt to respect public preferences when making trade-offs between different 
policy options. One way they do this is by using estimates of the monetary value of policy 
outcomes, which can be obtained using methods such as contingent valuation (e.g., Beattie et 
al., 1998). However, most of these estimates (e.g., fatalities prevented, improvements to health 
outcomes, or environmental damage prevented or rectified) reflect only the preferences that 
individuals express for their personal benefits and costs. The measures reflect individuals’ 
willingness to pay for reductions in their own risk, improvements in their own health, or benefits 
to their own enjoyment of environmental amenities, or their willingness to accept 
compensation for harms in these contexts. To some extent, this self-interested approach is 
legitimate, since it avoids double counting of the benefits of policies (for a useful discussion in 
relation to the Value of Statistical Life, see Jones-Lee, 199121). However, there is good reason to 
suppose people have preferences that extend beyond concern for themselves. These 
preferences include concern for efficiency (maximising the expected number of fatalities or 
cases of illness prevented) and equity (balancing risk reductions for different parts of the 
population22). Focusing exclusively on individuals’ values for their own gains or losses may 
neglect their preferences over the distribution of societal resources and thereby fail to 
adequately represent important sources of societal welfare.  
Accounting for preferences over efficiency and equity per se is not enough. To ensure that 
resource allocations maximise society’s welfare, policies must reflect the trade-offs that 
individuals would make between self-interest and these distributional concerns. After all, 
                                                 
21 Jones-Lee concludes that societal desire (or willingness to pay) for safety could be double counted when 
we account for the level of safety that we want for others in excess of what they want for themselves. He 
shows that this would be the case if altruism took a pure form (i.e., when people care about all 
determinants of others’ welfare) rather than being safety-focused (i.e., when they only care about others’ 
safety). The provision of ‘double-counted’ safety would be done at the expense of other determinants of 
welfare, and hence be suboptimal. 
22  Throughout this chapter, we use ‘equity’ to refer to ‘gains egalitarianism’ rather than ‘outcome 
egalitarianism’ (read more about this distinction on Tsuchiya and Dolan (2009)). This approach allows us 
to measure efficiency and equity on the same space: gains. We ask respondents to trade off more gains 




policies that influence the level of health and safety in a population usually do not apply only to 
some group of “others” to which the typical member of the public does not belong. Instead, the 
important preferences are those of members of the affected population. As such, attempting to 
respect equity preferences by relying on Person Trade-Off surveys23 where the respondent takes 
the role of the social planner cannot directly shed light on their preferences for the equity and 
efficiency of the policies that affect them. Nor can we use the experimental evidence from the 
laboratory on the preference for self and others in a monetary context, since the policy contexts 
are far removed from the distribution of a monetary endowment in the laboratory. Despite the 
critical importance of this question (i.e., how preferences for welfare interact with each other), 
the existing literature does not provide a satisfactory answer.  We present evidence that begins 
to address this issue: we elicit preferences in the context of health and safety policy choices; we 
use structured experimental designs that can isolate the relevant effects; and we explicitly test 
the effect of self-interest in determining preferences for the different policy options. 
Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 presents our experimental design. In 
section 4 we outline our results, and in Section 5 we discuss their implications. 
4.2. Theoretical Background 
Standard economic theory, which provides the theoretical foundation for classic preference 
elicitation methods (Braga & Starmer, 2005), assumes that people are self-interested, utility-
maximising agents. However, people’s behaviour is often not well-described by this assumption. 
This has been shown through experiments and surveys in a range of policy-relevant contexts, 
which we outline in this section. Yet, little is understood about how self-interest modifies the 
equity-efficiency trade-off. 
At the most abstract level, experimental economists have provided evidence that people are 
sometimes willing to reduce their own payoff in order to improve the payoff of others, which is 
contrary to the assumption of self-interested agents. This is demonstrated in Dictator Games, 
in which a participant receives some endowment of experimental tokens or cash and chooses 
how to distribute it between themselves and a randomly assigned, anonymous partner, the 
                                                 
23 In the Person Trade-Off method, respondents are asked to consider two different groups of people, 
each affected by a different ailment, and consisting of a different number of patients. They need to make 
choices about which group to help as the number of people in each group varies, up to the point when 
they consider both groups to be equally deserving to be helped. This method was first used by Patrick, 





“receiver”. Although the self-interested Nash Equilibrium predicts that the endowed player will 
keep the whole endowment for themselves, non-zero offers are the norm (see a 2011 meta-
analysis by Engel). The Ultimatum Game has one more stage than the Dictator game: the 
receiver can reject the offer of the other player, in which case both receive nothing. Again, non-
zero offers are pervasive, and receivers often reject low offers, reducing the total payoff to zero 
rather than accepting an unfair or inequitable distribution. Evidence along these lines is outlined 
in Guth et al. (1982); Kahneman et al. (1986); Roth et al. (1991); Camerer and Thaler (1995), and 
a useful review is provided by Guth and Kocher (2014). This laboratory evidence is accompanied 
by a wealth of theoretical models that account for preferences for others’ welfare (often 
modelled as interdependent preferences, such as in Bergstrom, 1999) and for distributional 
concerns (e.g., fairness models including Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 2000; and Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000). Human aversion to inequality has even been explained at the neural level by 
Tricomi et al. (2010).  
This laboratory evidence illuminates how individuals are willing to sacrifice self-interest to 
improve overall efficiency, and also to achieve more equitable distributions. However, 
preferences have been found to depend on the context in which they are elicited (see an early 
formalisation of this by Tversky and Simonson, 1993). Also, there is mixed evidence on whether 
behaviour in context-free experiments is the same as in experiments with framing, and in the 
field. Laury and Taylor (2008), Voors, Turley, Kontoleon, Bulte and List (2012), and Galizzi and 
Navarro-Martínez (2018) investigated the correlation between behaviour in context-free 
experiments (they used popular games such as the dictator and public good games) and 
behaviour in the field. The latter found no correlation, whereas the former found correlations 
in some instances only. In a context of unethical behaviour involving tax evasion and bribery 
respectively, Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992) and Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) found 
that the experiment framing did not make a difference. As such, we cannot make confident 
inferences from the laboratory evidence when considering the equity-efficiency trade-off in 
policy relevant contexts such as safety and health risk mitigation. 
There is a large body of work on the equity-efficiency trade-off in more realistic policy contexts. 
In the context of safety, there is a long and rich literature on the notion of fairness in public 
policymaking. In an early discussion, Charles Fried (1969, pp. 1426-1427) argues that: 
“The most obvious objection to a pure efficiency argument is an argument from fairness. 
[…] it is not sufficient to justify the choice of a particular life-saving strategy that it leads 




is fairly apportioned among the relevant population […] Fairness, thus is an important 
[…] constraint on efficiency”. 
Writing in Science, Arrow et al. (1996, p. 222) state: 
“Although benefit-cost analysis should focus primarily on the overall relation between 
benefits and costs, a good analysis will also identify important distributional 
consequences.” 
Despite the recognition that distributional consequences matter, it is not straightforward to 
define what they mean. For example, Viscusi (2008) sets out difficulties of being “fair” – for 
example if every expected fatality prevented is considered to be equally valuable, this implies 
that not all life years are equally valued, as some people are expected to live longer than others 
(although see Jones-Lee et al. (2015) for a discussion). Viscusi (p. 316) summarises with the 
insight that “what is viewed as equitable and what is not hinges quite critically on how one 
frames the fairness issue.” 
More progress has been made in the health economics literature. Bobinac et al. (2012) provide 
a useful review of the literature about the trade-offs between efficiency and equity when cost-
effectiveness is measured in quality adjusted life years (QALYs). They advocate consideration of 
both efficiency and equity concerns, where equity can be determined by patient characteristics 
such as age and whether or not they have dependents. Light (1992) discusses the efficiency-
equity trade-offs embedded in the healthcare system, beginning with the premise that equity 
and efficiency are both desirable. Wagstaff (1991) proposes a Social Welfare Function approach 
to incorporate these efficiency and equity concerns into health resource allocation decisions. 
However, neither Light nor Wagstaff provide empirical evidence about public preferences over 
the trade-off between efficiency and equity. Lindholm, Rosen and Emmelin (1996) examine the 
requirements for meaningful empirical estimates of the trade-off, and in a pilot study, they 
found that at least two thirds of the 68 Swedish politicians responsible for healthcare that took 
part in their study stated that they would be willing to give up efficiency to achieve more equity.  
Patrick and colleagues (1973) and Nord (1992) present the Person Trade-Off approach, a 
framework for eliciting trade-offs. These trade-offs are embedded in choices between helping 
different people to achieve different levels of health. Dolan (1998) extends this method and 
provides a small experimental test demonstrating a general preference for fairness. In his study, 
it was impossible to distinguish fairness in terms of treating the person who was initially worse 




Bleichrodt et al. (2005) present a method for non-parametric estimation of preferences for 
equality. These trade-offs were elicited in terms of cohorts of newborns with different potential 
QALYs over the lifetime. The results suggest that people are averse to inequalities in the domain 
of health, and the authors propose that policy values for health effects should be adjusted using 
equity weights. 
Ubel et al. (1996a) conduct a survey to elicit equity and efficiency trade-offs from a sample 
including the general public and from specialists including medical ethicists and experts in 
Medical Decision Making. They found that: 
“Fifty-six percent of the prospective jurors, 53 percent of the medical ethicists, and 41 
percent of the experts in medical decision making recommended offering [a] less 
effective screening test to everyone, even though 100 more lives would have been 
saved by offering [a] more expensive test to only a portion of the population.” (Ubel et 
al., 1996a, p. 1174) 
In follow up studies, Ubel et al. (2000) provide evidence that suggests the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity is not continuous, but rather the preference for equity is ‘all or none’. 
When respondents were offered a choice between a more efficient and a more equitable policy, 
if the equitable option did not help 100% of the population, then respondents chose the efficient 
one. On the other hand, Johannesson and Gerdtham (1996) had collected empirical evidence of 
the magnitude of the efficiency-equity trade-off, and they had found that respondents were 
“willing to give up 1 QALY in the group with more QALYs to gain 0.45 QALYs in the group with 
fewer QALYs” (pp. 365-366). They used a veil of ignorance approach, and a sample of 80 
students. 
All of the health studies mentioned elicit social preferences from impartial observers through 
Person Trade-Off or similar methodologies, setting aside self-interest. However, Ubel et al. 
(1996b) present an experiment that directly compares self-interested utility scores with 
impartial person trade-off responses to ask whether “people place the same values on health 
care conditions when thinking of their own health as when thinking about health care policy” 
(p. 109). They find strong evidence that the social and the self-interested perspectives generate 
different implied distributions of health. The utilities of the worst conditions implied from their 
impartial choices were much lower than those elicited when participants took a self-interested 
perspective. Similarly, Nord et al. (1999) consider different distributional preferences including 
aversion to inequalities in health and discuss how these preferences can be combined with a 




However, in both studies the social perspective and self-interested perspective are elicited, or 
proposed to be elicited, using completely different methods. In Ubel et al. (1996b), it is not clear 
to what extent any differences derive from differences in perspective, or from differences in the 
type of task. Specifically, when in the self-interested tasks, there was no scope to express 
preferences for equity.  
We present a study in which participants trade off different distributional concerns within the 
same task. In some cases, the participants had to trade off their own self-interest against these 
distributional concerns, while in other cases, they acted impartially. With a single type of task, 
we are able to explore the influence that self-interest has on the efficiency-equity trade-offs 
that people made.  
In addition to the main trade-offs, we explore whether the stake size can influence individuals’ 
willingness to trade efficiency for equity. We do this by manipulating whether the policies under 
consideration would prevent illnesses (low stakes) or fatalities (high stakes). It is plausible that 
pro-social preferences including the preference for equity are more evident when the stakes are 
lower than when the stakes are high. Evidence that changing monetary stakes can influence 
social preferences is presented by Forsythe et al. (1994) and by List and Cherry (2008). Camerer 
and Hogarth (1999) provide a useful review. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
comparable research has been conducted in the context of health and physical risk.  
The factors explored in our study – individuals’ private interest and concerns for efficiency and 
equity - are integral features of the trade-offs that society must make between policy outcomes. 
These trade-offs imply a set of underlying moral principles. For example, if individuals chose the 
policy that gives everyone in the population a risk reduction, despite offering a lower expected 
risk reduction overall, that implies that they are favouring equity over efficiency. A related but 
underexplored question is whether these principles can be elicited directly from members of 
the public; for instance, by asking them whether they agree or disagree with statements 
involving the principles. If so, would the policy decisions implied by people’s directly elicited 
moral principles be equivalent to the decisions implied by their explicit choices between policy 
outcomes? If that is the case, using moral principles to guide difficult trade-offs in policy making 





The methods presented here were developed on the basis of the findings of a pilot study (n=107) 
conducted with student participants at the University of Durham. Results of that pilot study are 
available on request. 
4.3.1. Scenario 
Participants were asked to imagine a city made up of an East and a West zone. The city’s 
inhabitants were at risk of potential adverse health effects resulting from a contaminated water 
supply, and participants expressed their preferences concerning different policy options to 
improve the situation. Participants were told that 100,000 people lived in each zone of the city, 
and that the city’s water supply came from two reservoirs. The reservoirs were contaminated 
by three types of bacteria (E, W and B) which differed in two respects: the zone they affected, 
and the anticipated number of people they would harm. The initial risks were not set to be equal 
across the zones: the West zone had a higher baseline risk than the East zone. The baseline case 
before policy intervention is presented in Table 9.  
Table 9. Baseline Risks 
Bacteria Name Baseline Risk in East Zone Baseline Risk in West Zone 
Bacteria E 10/100,000 0/100,000 
Bacteria W 0/100,000 20/100,000 
Bacteria B 8/100,000 8/100,000 
 Total = 18/100,000 Total = 28/100,000 
We manipulated self-interest between subjects by telling half of the participants that they lived 
in the East zone. The other half were not told they lived in the city at all, so can be assumed to 
adopt an impartial perspective24, analogous to that of a social planner. We can therefore use 
the choices of the impartial participants (who did not live in the city) to investigate trade-offs 
between efficiency and equity, and compare these with the choices of those who might be 
influenced by self-interest, to investigate how self-interest affects these trade-offs. 
Between subjects, we manipulated the harm that would be caused by the bacteria. For half of 
subjects, the bacteria would cause fatality. For the other half, the bacteria would cause 
gastroenteritis, a health complaint described as follows: 
                                                 
24 Even if participants did assume they lived in the city, there is no reason for them to suppose they lived 




Gastroenteritis caused by these bacteria is not contagious between people and it 
cannot kill you, but people infected will have the following symptoms for 
approximately two weeks: Watery diarrhoea; Abdominal cramps and pain; Nausea, 
vomiting, or both; Occasional muscle aches or headache; Low-grade fever. 
We defined four policy options, which are outlined in Table 10. The policies differed in which 
bacteria they targeted (and hence which zone they helped), as well as in the magnitude of the 
risk reductions. 




(Baseline Risk = 18/100,000) 
WEST ZONE 
(Baseline Risk = 28/100,000) 
    
Risk Reduction Final Risk Risk Reduction Final Risk 
Policy E 10/100,000 8/100,000 0 28/100,000 
Policy W 0 18/100,000 20/100,000 8/100,000 
Policy B 8/100,000 10/100,000 8/100,000 20/100,000 
Policy X 3/100,000 15/100,000 4/100,000 24/100,000 
Policy E eliminates bacteria E, which is expected to affect 10 people all in the East zone but does 
not help the West zone. Policy W eliminates bacteria W, which is expected to affect 20 people 
all in the West zone but does not help the East zone. Therefore, option W is the most efficient 
(because it offers the greatest expected reduction in harm) but option E is the self-interested 
option for those subjects who were asked to assume they lived in Zone E. Options B and X 
improve safety in both zones. Policy option B eliminates bacteria B and is equitable in the 
absolute sense, since it reduces the risk in both zones by the same amount. Option X reduces 
the risk in both zones by a smaller amount that is close to proportional to the initial risk in each 
zone.  
See the instructions, bacteria and policy descriptions as participants saw them in Appendix C.1. 
4.3.2. Tasks 
The study consisted of three sections: the policy rating and comprehension task, where 
participants became familiarised with the policies; the stated principles task, in which 
participants rated their agreement with a series of relevant statements of moral principles; and 
the preferences task, in which participants made choices between policy options. First, we 
presented the rating and comprehension tasks. Then, we randomised the order in which the 




Policy rating and comprehension task 
Each of the water cleaning options was presented on the screen, and the participant rated each 
policy as very poor, poor, satisfactory, good, or very good (see example in Figure 13).  
Figure 13. Example Rating Question 
 
This gives us an initial assessment of how good the policy options were regarded to be. Also, it 
ensured that participants carefully considered each of the options before they were asked to 
complete the stated principles and preferences tasks. To check whether the important 
properties of the policies were understood, participants answered either four or five 
comprehension questions (depending on the condition). These are outlined in Table 11. In all 
cases, the information about the policies was displayed on screen, and the respondent had to 
identify the correct policy in each comparison. After the decision was made, participants were 
shown the correct answer with an explanation. The questions were presented in random order, 





Table 11. Comprehension Questions 
Comparison Question Correct answer 
1 Policy E vs. 
Policy W 
Which option would make the water safer for the people 
who are most at risk from the bacteria? 
Policy W 
2 Policy W vs. 
Policy X 
Which option would make the water a lot safer for some 
of the people who live in the city rather than a little safer 
for everyone who lives in the city? 
Policy W 
3 Policy B vs. 
Policy E 
Which option saves lives (avoids gastroenteritis cases) in 
both zones of the city rather than in just one zone of the 
city? 
Policy B 
4 Policy W vs. 
Policy B 
Which option would save the most lives (avoid the most 
gastroenteritis cases)? 
Policy W 
5 Policy B vs. 
Policy X* 
Which option would make the water safest for you and 
your household? 
Policy E 
Note. The comparison between B and X (marked with an asterisk) was only asked of those people in the 
self-Interest condition. 
Stated Principles task 
Participants were presented with six pairs of statements (see Table 12). Each statement is a 
trade-off between two relevant principles, which were written to represent opposite ways of 
thinking about how options should be prioritised. Each statement favoured one principle over 
the other, forcing participants to explicitly express a relative preference between competing 
moral principles (or indicate indifference between them).  This design also prevented 
participants from agreeing with all principles due to a desire to conform to social norms. 
Participants indicated which of the two statements in the pair they favoured, and how strongly. 




Figure 14. Example Stated Principles Question 
 
We asked participants to trade off the following principles: (i) efficiency (to maximise the 
expected number of cases prevented), (ii) equity (to evenly spread the risk reduction across 
everyone in the city), (iii) self-interest (to prioritise own risk reduction), (iv) helping those most 
at risk (i.e., to reduce the risk of those with the highest baseline), and (v) offering a higher risk 
reduction to only a few citizens.  
On the basis of this task, we constructed an efficiency preference score that indicates the 
preference for efficiency against other concerns. The score is the sum of the times efficiency is 
favoured over the concern it is traded-off against. The trade-offs that did not involve efficiency 
were included to induce participants to consider principles in the wider sense, and not only as 
a trade-off against efficiency. The preferences captured by the efficiency preference score will 
be compared with those elicited in the preference task (see below). However, we wanted to 
rule out the possibility that consistency between these two tasks was merely a result of 
participants’ desire to appear coherent rather than a reflection of the consistency of true 
underlying preferences. By randomising whether the stated principles task was presented 
before or after the preference task, we are able to observe systematic differences in responses 





Table 12. Stated Principles Task 
Trade-Off Principle A Principle B 
1 Equity vs. 
Efficiency 
The chosen option should make the 
water safer for everyone who lives in 
the city even if that means that fewer 
lives are saved. 
The chosen option should save the 
most lives even if that means that the 
water is made safer for only some of 
the people who live in the city. 
2 Helping those 
most at risk 
vs. Efficiency 
The chosen option should make the 
water safer for the people who are 
most at risk from the bacteria even if 
that means that fewer lives are saved. 
The chosen option should save the 
most lives even if that means that the 
water is not made safer for the people 
who are most at risk from the bacteria. 
3 Equity vs. 
Inequity 
The chosen option should make the 
water a little safer for everyone rather 
than a lot safer for only some of the 
people in the city. 
The chosen option should make the 
water a lot safer for only some of the 
people in the city rather than a little 
safer for everyone. 
4 Equity vs. 
Helping those 
most at risk 
The chosen option should make the 
water a little safer for everyone rather 
than a lot safer for the people who are 
most at risk from the bacteria. 
The chosen option should make the 
water a lot safer for the people who 
are most at risk from the bacteria 
rather than a little safer for everyone. 
5 Self-interest 
vs.         
Helping those 
most at risk* 
The chosen option should make the 
water safer for me even if that means 
that the water is not made safer for 
the people who are most at risk from 
the bacteria. 
The chosen option should make the 
water safer for the people who are 
most at risk from the bacteria even if 
that means that the water is not made 
safer for me. 
6 Self-interest 
vs.   
Efficiency* 
The chosen option should make the 
water safer for me even if that means 
fewer lives are saved. 
The chosen option should save the 
most lives even if that means the 
water is not made safer for me. 
Note. Questions marked with an asterisk were shown to participants in the self-interest condition only. 
Preference Choice task 
The questions in the preference task asked respondents to choose between policies. We 
informed participants that due to the cost of treating the bacteria in the reservoirs, the 
government would not be able to implement all the policies. We told them: “The following 
questions will ask you to tell us your opinion about which of the options you would prefer the 
government to choose25. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your 
honest opinion.” The questions presented the options in pairs. With four policies, this generates 
six comparisons (B vs W; E vs W; X vs W; E vs B; X vs B; X vs E). Every respondent saw every 
                                                 
25 This framing allows us to use the same wording in both the self-interested and impartial conditions. It 




comparison, and the order in which the comparisons were presented was randomised for each 
participant. 
Figure 15. Preference Elicitation Task Example 
 
Note. In this example, the participant was in the self-interest condition. For these participants, we 
highlighted that they lived in the East zone to ensure they understood which of the policies would 
directly affect them, and by how much. For other participants, the parentheses and their contents 
were omitted.  
Figure 15 shows a typical preference elicitation screen. Participants saw summaries of the 
policies, and more details were available if they clicked “view full description below”. We 
randomised which options were presented on the left and right of the display. We asked 
participants to select which policy they would prefer the government to choose, and to indicate 
the strength of their preference. 
To summarise, the study employed a 2x2x2 between-subjects design. The first distinction was 
the manipulation of self-interest. Specifically, half of subjects were told they lived in the East 
zone, whilst the other half were not told they lived in the city at all, so can be assumed to adopt 
an impartial perspective. The second distinction was the type of consequence the risk had: for 
half of the participants, the risk was contracting gastroenteritis, whilst for the other half it was 
the risk of death. The final distinction randomised whether participants undertook the 





The study was completed online by a non-student sample of UK residents. We obtained 322 
completed responses, assigned to treatments as outlined in Table 13. Our sample is 48% female, 
ranging in age from 20 to 71 (M = 38.6, SD = 10.83), and with an average household size of 4 (M 
= 3.9, SD = 1.57). Household members included any close relatives living in the household (e.g., 
children, spouse or partner, parents). The randomisation to treatments was successful, with no 
significant differences in age, gender, number of dependants, or the percentage of 
comprehension questions correctly answered (87% overall) between conditions. The study was 
implemented in Qualtrics and distributed through Prolific Academic, an online labour market. 
The median time taken to complete this study was 13 minutes. Participants received a fixed 
payment of £2.50 for their participation. 
Table 13. Assignment to Treatments 
 Self-Interested (n=160) Impartial (n=162) 
   








Gastroenteritis (n=160) 40 40 40 40 
Death (n=162) 42 38 41 41 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Descriptive Results 
Ratings  
Participants rated each of the four policy options on a five-point scale from “very poor” to “very 
good”. See the distribution of the ratings for each of the policy options in Figure 16. 
The highest rated policy option was option B, which eliminates bacteria 𝛽 reducing the risk in 
each of the two zones by 8/100,000. This option is the most equitable, and also relatively 
efficient since it reduces risk by 16/200,000 overall. The ratings of option B were significantly 
higher than those of the second highest rated option, W, as indicated by a Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test (p-value < .01). Option W is the most efficient, since it saves 20 lives, and these lives are of 
those people most at risk; but it is not equitable, since all of the benefit occurs in the West Zone. 
Option W was ranked significantly higher than option X (p-value < .01) and E (p-value < .01).  




the risk in the East zone alone by 10/10,000. There were no significant differences in the ratings 
of options X and E (p-value = .931). Overall, this generates the preference ordering B>W>X=E. 
Figure 16. Ratings of the Policy Options 
 
Figure 16 shows the overall distribution of ratings, but does not distinguish between those by 
people in the different treatments. Table 14 provides this breakdown, showing that there is a 
significant difference in the rating of option E and B depending on whether respondents were 
self-interested or impartial. In both cases, the ratings by participants in the impartial condition 
were slightly lower. There are no other significant differences between the ratings of 
participants in the self-interested and impartial conditions, nor between the ratings of 
participants in the death and the gastroenteritis treatments. 




 (1 = very poor; 
5 = very good) 
WILCOXON RANK-SUM TEST P-VALUE 
 
Ha: Self-Interested ≠ Impartial Ha: Death ≠ Gastroenteritis 
Policy W 2.91 (0.01) n.s. n.s. 
Policy E 2.53 (0.99) 2.64 (0.97) vs. 2.41 (0.99)* n.s. 
Policy B 3.29 (0.92) 3.41 (0.90) vs. 3.17 (0.94)* n.s. 
Policy X 2.54 (0.97) n.s. n.s. 





Participants stated the strength of preference (strong, moderate, or slight) with which they 
favoured one principle over the other in each trade-off. They could use the midpoint of the scale 
to indicate indifference. The distribution of the answers to the principle trade-offs are shown in 
Figure 17. Each plot presents a trade-off between the two principles on the x-axis. For example, 
on Trade-off 1 the first bar presents the percentage of participants who indicated that they 
strongly favoured equity over efficiency.  
Figure 17. (Dis)agreement with Statements of Principle 
 
The more polarised preferences were those in the pairs of statements where respondents had 
to trade off self-interest against another concern. In the case of self-interest vs. “helping those 
most at risk”, 43.8% of respondents moderately or strongly favoured helping those most at risk 
over self-interest; in the case of efficiency, this percentage increased to 45.6%. These trade-offs 
might have been the easiest to make, given that there is a clear virtuous response not to 
prioritise oneself. That is not the case when trading off the other principles. The most finely 
balanced trade-off was between efficiency and helping those most at risk: almost 20% of 
participants equally favoured the statements, just less than 20% slightly favoured efficiency and 
just over 20% slightly favoured helping those most at risk. This indicates that this may be the 




A one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejected the hypothesis of indifference between 
principles in all six comparisons. The answers, split by condition, are shown in Table 15. We 
found no significant difference between participants in the self-interest and the impartial 
conditions, and no difference depending on whether the principle statements were completed 
before or after the preference task. However, the preference for efficiency over equity, and of 
efficiency over helping those most at risk was stronger for participants in the condition with the 
risk of death, compared to gastroenteritis.  
These principles appear to be transitive, as an order of preference can be established from the 
answers to the principle trade-off questions: efficiency ≻ helping those most at risk ≻ equity ≻ 
self-interest. Moreover, this task supports the results of the rating task in suggesting that equity 
and efficiency are both important, and that self-interest is not sufficient to override these 
preferences.  
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0.48 (1.55) vs.  
-0.09 (1.58 )** 
n.s. 
3 Equity vs Inequity 
-0.50*** 
(1.68) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. 
4 
Equity vs Helping 
those most at risk 
0.73*** 
(1.60) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. 
5 
Self-interest vs 










n/a n.s. n.s. 
Notes. a -3 = strongly favour the 1st concern over the 2nd; 3 = strongly favour the 2nd concern over the 
1st); *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05, n.s.: not significant. 
Preference Choices 
Initially, we present the proportion of all choices in which a given policy option was chosen (i.e., 
when it was strongly, moderately, or slightly preferred to its comparator). These are presented 




Figure 18. Policy Option Choice Proportions 
 
In line with the ratings data, option B was the most preferred, followed by W, with options E 
and X being chosen in a similar proportion of choices. To look more deeply into the choice data, 
we present the breakdown of the results for each comparison. In each one, participants selected 
a point from “strongly prefer Y” to “strongly prefer Z” where Y and Z are policy options under 
consideration.  Option Y is always the more efficient option of the pair, where efficiency is the 
greater magnitude of risk reduction. For example, in the W vs. B comparison, a strong 
preference for Y would mean that the more efficient option W was strongly preferred to the 
less efficient option B. Table 16 presents the mean responses for each of the policy choices.  
Table 16 also shows the means for the different groups in a treatment, in the cases when they 
are significantly different. This was the case in four of the choices for the self-interested and the 
impartial participants. When the most efficient option and the one that benefited the self-
interested participants the most were not the same, then self-interested participants still chose 
the most efficient one, but their strength of preference was significantly lower than that of the 
impartial participants. The exception to this is the trade-off between policy B and W: on average, 
self-interested participants had a slight preference for B (which is the one that benefitted them 
the most), while impartial participants had a slight preference for W, which reduced risks by 4 
more cases overall.  
There were no significant differences in the answers of respondents who considered fatality 
risks and those who considered the risk of gastroenteritis. Recall that in the principle 
statements, we did find a difference between participants in these two conditions. It may be 
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We also found a significant difference in the choices between policies X and B for those 
participants who answered the principle statements task before the choices, and those who 
answered after. On average, both groups chose the most efficient alternative, but their strength 
of preference varied. Even though this difference was statistically significant, it is very small in 
magnitude. It appears that participants who had thought about trade-offs between moral 
principles before this task were slightly more sensitive to the differences in risk baselines. This 
might explain why their strength of preference for option B, which offered an equal risk 
reduction in both zones, was lower than that for X, which offered a higher risk reduction to 
those most at risk.  







Ha: Mean ≠ 0 
WILCOXON RANK-SUM TEST P-VALUE 
  
 
Ha: Self-Int’d ≠ 
Impartial 
Ha: Death ≠ 
Gastro 






1 BE W -0.08 (1.87) n.s. 
-0.51 (1.93) vs. 
0.36 (1.71)*** 
n.s. n.s. 
2 EE W 1.40 (1.53)*** 
0.94 (1.69) vs. 
1.85 (1.19)*** 
n.s. n.s. 
3 XE W 1.14 (1.85)*** 
0.78 (1.99) vs. 
1.51 (1.64)** 
n.s. n.s. 
4 EE B 1.96 (1.33)*** 
1.76 (1.53) vs. 
2.17 (1.05)* 
n.s. n.s. 
5 X BE 2.21 (1.15)*** n.s. n.s. 
2.09 (1.22) vs. 
2.34 (1.06)* 
6 X EE 0.44 (1.73)*** n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Notes. Superscript E denotes the option that was better for the East zone population, i.e., the self-interested 
participants; *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05, n.s.: not significant.  
4.4.2. Summary regressions 
So far, our analysis has hinted that efficiency, equity and self-interest all play a role in 
determining the ratings of, and preferences between, different policy options. However, until 
now we have been unable to quantify the effects of different motivations, particularly that of 
self-interest. Nor have we investigated in depth the magnitude of the differences between the 
gastroenteritis and fatality subsamples, or that of answering the principle statements task 
before or after the main preference questions. To address all of these issues, we next present a 




In the five logistic regression models presented in Table 17, the dependent variable is choosing 
the most efficient option in the pair of policy options. We present odds ratios, which can be 
interpreted as the relative likelihood that the efficient option is chosen, given that independent 
variable. Because every participant answered 6 questions, standard errors were clustered at the 
participant level. Model (1) includes only demographic variables, and none significantly alters 
the odds of choosing the most efficient option. Model (2) adds the main effects. Model (3) adds 
the two-way interactions and model (4) adds a three-way interaction. Last, model (5) accounts 
for the effect of participants’ preference for efficiency, as stated in the principles task, and its 
interaction with their preference for efficiency and equity inferred from their choices in the 
preference task.  
We included a dummy variable capturing the effect of being in the fatality scenario compared 
to the gastroenteritis scenario. Perhaps surprisingly, we found no significance, either for the 
main effect or for any interactions. This implies that individuals make the same trade-offs 
between equity, efficiency and self-interest regardless of whether they are answering questions 
about gastroenteritis or about fatality. This may indicate that, within the domain of health and 
physical risk, preferences are not stake-sensitive. Alternatively, it might indicate that the 
gastroenteritis condition was severe enough that both treatments were perceived to have high 
stakes.  
We also included a dummy variable controlling for the order in which participants answered the 
preference questions compared to the statements questions. Again, there were no significant 
main effects or interactions. This is reassuring, implying that preferences and statements of 
principle are reasonably well aligned, and that response to choice questions in this context is 
not altered as a result of stating moral principles. Last, we included a dummy to account for 
whether the participant was in the self-interest or the impartial condition (see discussion of this 
effect below).  
Turning to the characteristics of the policies (see a summary of these values for each policy in 
Appendix C.2), efficiency is defined as the number of cases prevented by Policy Y (the most 
efficient option in any given comparison) minus the number of cases prevented by Policy Z (the 
other option in the comparison). In all cases, efficiency is a positive and significant predictor. For 
each additional incidence of harm prevented by Policy Y compared to Policy Z, respondents are 
between 11.5% and 18.5% more likely to choose the efficient option. This effect is robust across 




Equity is defined as the difference between the numbers of cases prevented in the West and in 
the East by policy Y, less the difference between the numbers of cases prevented in the West 
and in the East by policy Z. Thus, higher equity indicates that the efficient option is also the most 
equitable. Equity is another robust, positive indicator for choice, so that when the efficient 
policy is also more equitable than the other policy, it is more likely to be chosen. Specifically, for 
a one-person difference in equity between the policies, the efficient option is between 8% and 
11% more likely to be chosen. A Wald test indicated that the coefficients of the variables 
capturing efficiency and equity concerns were significantly different (p-value < .05). 
Half the participants were told they lived in the East zone, and the main effect of this is captured 
by the dummy self-interested. We refer to these participants as ‘self-interested’ because they 
had personal reasons to prefer options with the largest reductions in risk in that zone26.  We 
found that they were significantly less likely to choose the most efficient option than impartial 
participants; this implies that they took into account considerations other than efficiency. This 
interpretation is supported by the coefficients relating to benefit in the East zone. Benefit in the 
East zone is defined as the number of lives saved in the East zone by policy Y, minus the number 
of lives saved in the East zone by policy Z. There is no significant main effect of this predictor at 
the 5% level. However, as expected, the odds ratio of the interaction between the self-interested 
dummy variable and the benefit to the East zone is greater than 1 and significant: participants 
prefer policies that benefit the East zone, but only if they are in the self-interested condition. 
Specifically, whilst impartial participants are marginally less likely to select the efficient option 
if it benefits the East zone27, self-interested participants were around 9% more likely to opt for 
it. A Wald test indicated that the effect of the interaction of self-interest and efficiency in the 
East was significantly smaller than that of overall efficiency; this suggests that self-interest does 
not override affected participants’ concern for efficiency. 
The variable favour efficiency corresponds to the efficiency preference score, defined based on 
the stated principles task. The score captures the extent to which participants favoured 
efficiency over the concerns it was traded-off against (i.e., equity, self-interest and helping those 
most at risk). Model (5) suggests that for every additional principle efficiency was favoured over, 
                                                 
26 If self-interest was the only motivation, the preference ordering would be E>B>X>W, since these reduce 
the East zone risk by 10, 8, 3 and 0 in 100,000 respectively. In contrast if Efficiency is the only motivator 
the ranking would be W>B>E>X. 
27 At the 10% level, people are around 4% less likely to choose the efficient option if it saves an additional 





the odds of choosing policy Y over Z increased by 58%. This corroborates the fact that the 
preferences stated in the principles trade-offs tasks are strongly aligned with those that can be 
inferred from choices in the preference task.  
The odds ratios of the interactions between the favour efficiency variable and the main effects 
efficiency and equity can be regarded as multiplier effects. At a 5% significance level, every 
additional concern efficiency was favoured over in the statements task did not have multiplier 
effect on the preference for efficiency 28 . In the case of equity, the higher the efficiency 
preference score, the more the odds of choosing the most equitable option were lowered. One 
of the principles that efficiency was traded-off against was equity, hence the higher the number 
of principles efficiency was favoured over, the more likely it was that they preferred it against 
equity. This made choosing the most efficient policy 1.3% less likely, plausibly in favour of the 
more equitable option. 
  
                                                 




Table 17. Odds Ratios (robust standard errors, in 322 clusters at the participant level) 
Choice of the efficient option Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Main effects of choice scenario      
Efficiency (Difference in total 
efficiency between Y and Z) 
 
 1.151*** 1.185*** 1.185*** 1.115*** 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Equity (Difference in equity 
between Y and Z) 
 
 1.084*** 1.109*** 1.109*** 1.114*** 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) 
Benefit East (Difference in benefit 
to the East zone between Y and Z) 
 1.004 0.962 0.961  
 (0.0102) (0.021) (0.023)  
Main effects of treatment      
Self-interested (Dummy: assigned to 
living in the East zone treatment = 1) 
 
 0.502*** 0.569* 0.569*  
 (0.085) (0.146) (0.146)  
Fatality scenario (Dummy: assigned to 
fatality scenario treatment = 1) 
 
 1.113 1.077 1.076  
 (0.186) (0.252) (0.252)  
Statements first (Dummy: assigned 
to answer Stated Principles task first 
treatment = 1) 
 1.254 1.259 1.259  
 (0.211) (0.297) (0.297)  
Interactions      
Efficiency*Self-interested   0.957 0.957  
   (0.023) (0.023)  
Efficiency*Fatality scenario   1.001 1.001  
   (0.024) (0.024)  
Efficiency*Statements first   0.990 0.990  
   (0.024) (0.024)  
Equity*Self-interested   0.969 0.969  
   (0.016) (0.016)  
Equity*Fatality scenario   0.996 0.996  
   (0.015) (0.015)  
Equity*Statements first   0.999 0.999  
   (0.015) (0.015)  
Benefit East*Self-interested    1.093*** 1.094**  
   (0.022) (0.030)  
Benefit East*Fatality scenario   1.008 1.009  
   (0.020) (0.026)  
Benefit East*Statements first   0.973 0.973  
   (0.019) (0.019)  
Benefit East *Self-interested* Fatality scenario   0.998  
    (0.033)  
Principles      
Favour Efficiency     1.580*** 
     (0.192) 
Efficiency*Favour Efficiency     1.029 
     (0.016) 
Equity*Favour Efficiency     0.987* 
     (0.007) 
Demographics      
Age (years) 1.010 1.014 1.014 1.014  
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Female (dummy, 1=yes) 0.889 0.859 0.857 0.857  
 (0.129) (0.144) (0.146) (0.146)  
Household size 0.964 0.966 0.965 0.965  
 (0.046) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055)  
Constant 2.182* 1.807 1.799 1.799  
 (0.728) (0.771) (0.855) (0.856)  
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920  





When considering different policy options, decision makers must trade different principles 
against one another. These principles include efficiency and equity. To respect the preferences 
of the affected population, it is important to understand the extent to which individuals would 
be willing to trade efficiency for equity. In addition to that, it is also important to understand 
whether these trade-offs are robust to the influence of self-interest. We presented a between-
subjects experiment designed to test how individuals trade off these competing principles and 
to understand how self-interest modifies these trade-offs.  
On balance, we found evidence that efficiency is the most important factor. Policies should be 
implemented if they are the most effective, saving the most lives or preventing the most harm. 
However, equity was also an important concern and participants in our sample were almost as 
highly influenced by equity as by efficiency. In direct comparisons of principles, efficiency was 
slightly preferred to equity, but in the direct choice between policy W (the most efficient) and 
policy B (the most equitable) there was a very even split in preference between the two options. 
Overall, this suggests that whilst efficiency matters, equity is also sufficiently important to 
warrant attention when choosing between different policy options.  
This result holds even when participants are included in the scenarios and stand to benefit from 
different policies. We observed that participants in the self-interest condition favoured those 
policies that would benefit them particularly. However, the effect of self-interest was 
significantly smaller than that of the efficiency and not differentiable from that of the equity 
concerns. These results, quantifying the difference between preferences of ‘affected’ and 
‘impartial’ respondents, contribute to the debate on whose preferences should be taken into 
account to inform policy (see, for instance, Dolan (1999)). They provide empirical evidence of 
the extent to which these differ, and hence what the trade-offs will be when we try to satisfy 
either of these groups. More generally, these results provide further evidence that metrics that 
capture private interest only do not provide an accurate representation of people’s preferences.  
Aside from self-interest, we also manipulated whether the risks that respondents were trading 
off were fatal or not (i.e., risk of gastroenteritis). We did not find significant differences in the 
preferences reported by participants in the two conditions. In the health context, differently to 
laboratory settings (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), stakes do not seem to matter.  
We also explored the relationship between individuals’ directly elicited moral principles and 




Respondents’ answers to the principle statement trade-offs revealed a transitive ordering of the 
principles we focused on (efficiency ≻ equity ≻ self-interest). This ordering was consistent with 
the one underlying choices in the preference task, and also aligned with the one suggested by 
the ratings. These findings are encouraging – they are a first indication that moral principles 
could be explored as a substitute for, or complement to, stated preferences elicited through 
choice. This unlocks the possibility of answering policy questions that are difficult to approach 
empirically with choice-based methods, such as whether and how to incorporate altruistic 
concerns into policy valuations. A rich theoretical discussion about these issues can be found in 
Jones-Lee (1991; 1992) and Johansson (1992; 1994).  
As discussed, our study answers policy-relevant questions about the role of self-interest in 
influencing the trade-off between efficiency and equity in policy applications; and about the use 
of principles as a policy tool. Our results also raise thought-provoking questions about the 
mechanisms at play when individuals make complex moral trade-offs. Take respondents in the 
impartial treatment: these respondents’ choices must be driven by their preferences for the 
distribution of risk reductions across the population. That is, they cannot be influenced by self-
interest. In contrast, respondents in the self-interest condition cannot be revealing purely 
distributional concerns – they also have to take account of their own outcomes. This changes 
the interpretation of expressed preferences for equitable or efficient outcomes that do not 
favour the area where they (hypothetically) lived. The preferences of the participants in the self-
interest condition must also embody altruistic concern for others, since the respondent is 
showing a willingness to forgo benefit to themselves in order to benefit others in the scenario. 
Our results suggest that altruism does characterise individuals’ preferences for policy outcomes, 
since they are indeed willing to forgo risk reduction to achieve greater efficiency and equity 
overall. However, there is opportunity for future investigations to extend this empirical work, 
using the experimental paradigm we have developed to further our understanding of this rich 
and complex empirical question. 
Finally, the answers in this study, as those in most studies involving health outcomes, are 
hypothetical. This might raise doubts about their validity, as aside from respondents’ 
preferences over the distribution of the risk reductions, respondent’s wish to act in a socially 
desirable manner may have influenced answers too. In this study, participants were asked to 
indicate which policy options they would prefer the government to choose. Hence, it was up to 
respondents to decide whether this corresponded to their true preferences or what they 




therefore argue that socially desirable answers may be as valid a basis for public policy as 





Chapter 5. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we set out to explore some of the issues that emerge when we estimate the 
societal value of life and health.  In particular, those that may be observed due to the lack of 
descriptive validity of economic theory, which underlies the elicitation methods and the value 
metrics rely on. First, expected utility theory may not provide a valid description of people’s 
behaviour under risk. Second, the account that people exclusively care about maximising their 
own utility, disregarding that of others, may not be accurate. Furthering our understanding of 
these issues is crucial to ensure that public budgets can be allocated to maximise the 
population’s welfare. In what follows, the most important findings from each chapter are 
highlighted.  
In Chapter 2, we studied the disparities between the utility estimates elicited directly and 
indirectly using the standard gamble method. They may be caused by the failure of the reduction 
of compound lotteries axiom, but they also may be (at least partially) caused by the context in 
which the estimates are elicited. We moved away from the affective nature of health and 
incentivised answers, and found that when choice complexity was the lowest the disparities 
persisted. This suggests that context may play a role, but it is not sufficient to explain the 
disparities. As other studies before ours (e.g., Oliver, 2003; Abdellaoui, Klibanoff, & Placido, 
2015; Harrison, Martin-Correa, & Swarthout, 2015), we provide evidence of the failure of the 
reduction of compound lotteries. We are the first to do this eliciting probability equivalents in 
an incentivised study outside of the monetary domain. These findings do not provide direct 
evidence against the use of the standard gamble method, as they were not obtained in the 
context of health. However, they do call for caution when using this method, and for future 
research in this area. A natural extension of this study would be to use the same experimental 
paradigm to test our hypotheses in a setup that progressively converged to that of health and 
life valuation studies.  
The second set of results from this study concerns choice complexity, which we conceptualised 
as the difficulty involved in comparing outcomes to each other when a lot of their attributes are 
not shared. According to expected utility theory, the probability and subjective value of the 
outcomes are the only two features of the choice that should enter decisions. We kept these 
two features constant across questions and found that the complexity of the choice (which is 
lower when the outcomes are money, and higher when they are consumer goods) did influence 




than for consumer goods, despite each participant had indicated that the two were equivalent 
in value. This evidence speaks against the descriptive validity of expected utility theory. 
In Chapter 3, in order to find out more about the role of choice complexity, we tested whether 
the common ratio effect would persist with consumer goods. This effect is a violation of 
expected utility theory independence axiom, widely replicated in the laboratory with monetary 
outcomes. This experimental paradigm may fall short when looking for a broader descriptive 
account of behaviour. People’s everyday decisions involve complex, multi-faceted 
consequences (rather than simpler, unidimensional ones as money). Therefore, models built on 
evidence solely from choices involving monetary amounts may fail to capture the nuances of 
actual decision making.  
As many before us had done, we replicated the common ratio effect with money. Contrary to 
what the only two existing studies testing this effect in a non-monetary domain had found 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Keller, 1985b), we did not find the effect with objects. The choice 
patterns we observed with consumer goods could be regarded as evidence of the validity of 
expected utility theory. However, this theory predicts that as long as the subjective value of the 
outcomes (and the probabilities associated to them, possibly weighted) are the same, choice 
patterns in decisions involving money and equivalent objects should be the same, as that is not 
what we found. Instead, the greater consistency found with objects may be caused by 
participants resorting to heuristics (such as ‘always pick the prospect that offers the best payoff’) 
when decisions are too difficult to make because they are too complex. These findings are in 
line with those in the previous chapter. These results support the idea that preferences and 
attitudes may be domain-specific, which is already acknowledged in the case of risk attitudes 
(Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). Also, our results question the use of money to proxy other goods 
in the lab (as having the same subjective value will not warrant equivalent decisions); especially 
in instances where the goal is to develop and/or to test models of decision making that we aim 
to generalise to goods beyond money. 
In the remainder of the thesis, we focused on the study of people’s preferences. In Chapter 4, 
we aimed to provide an empirical account of the preferences that ought to be captured by value 
metrics such as the value of statistical life. This is the only study to date to look at how self-
interest affects the trade-off between efficiency and equity in the context of physical and fatality 
risk reductions. We found that efficiency (maximising the expected number of fatalities or cases 
of illness prevented) matters the most, with (gains) equity (evenly distributing risk reductions 




(hypothetical) policy prevented overall, participants were around 18% more likely to choose it; 
whereas when the additional case achieved a more equitable distribution, this percentage 
dropped to 11%. With regards to self-interest, having one’s own risk reduction at stake did not 
alter one’s concern for overall efficiency or equity, but participants whose risk reduction was at 
stake did give more weight to efficiency in their area. The magnitude of this effect was smaller 
than that of the preference for overall efficiency, and so the general preference of efficiency 
over equity prevailed for all participants. Policy makers should take these preferences into 
consideration when making allocative decisions or designing health interventions. These results 
also contribute to the debate of whose preferences should be considered in order to inform 
policy: those of the affected population, or the general population (e.g., Dolan, 1999). Our 
findings suggest that in terms of the trade-offs between efficiency and equity concerns, the 
welfare difference that could be achieved by eliciting either group’s preference would not differ 
substantially. 
An interesting finding was the null effect of risk severity in the trade-offs participants made. One 
of our experimental conditions involved the risk of gastroenteritis, whereas the other condition 
involved the risk of death. We did not find significant differences in the preferences reported by 
participants in the two conditions. This evidence indicates that in the health context, differently 
to context-free laboratory settings (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), stakes do not appear to matter.  
In the same study, we also explored the relationship between individuals’ elicited moral 
principles and their choices. We did this in a preference task that involved implicitly trading off 
these same concerns. We elicited trade-offs between different principles and found that, in the 
aggregate, these trade-offs gave rise to a transitive ordering of the principles that was consistent 
to that revealed by respondents’ choices. This might be the first step taken in a promising 
avenue of valuation research, where statements of principle could also be used to elicit societal 
preferences.  
This research contributes to the literature on health and life valuation, decision making under 
risk, and social preferences. It answered some questions, and it raised some new queries. With 
regards to the disparities within the standard gamble method, there are still some 
underexplored factors that could have an effect on them. With our experimental paradigm, we 
could study preference imprecision. Using participants’ answers about how sure they were 
about their answers, aided by a behavioural, rather than not self-reported, measure such as 
response time, we could gain valuable insights about the variability of people’s answers even 




studies could be considered exploratory initial steps. The current literature does not 
acknowledge the full extent of its influence on decision making, but our results suggest that this 
factor does have an effect. Future work should formalise the concept so that its influence can 
be tested using appropriate economic techniques. This strand of work could benefit from an 
improved item pool to test the hypotheses (for example, outcomes that differ in a very specific 
number of attributes but are exactly the same with regards to their other features). 
Finally, when studying social preferences, it may be worth presenting a broader range of 
scenarios to participants. It is plausible that some respondents may have favoured a principle 
over the other, but not on the terms we presented them (i.e., with the trade-offs involving the 
exact number of people in our scenarios). The important policy implications of this sort of 
studies call for thorough robustness checks of the results before they can be implemented. A 
finding that should be probed further in future research is the main effect of efficiency gains in 
the self-interested zone. Although this effect was only significant at a 10% level, its direction 
makes it interesting. The fact that respondents were less likely to choose a policy when it offered 
a higher efficiency gain in the East zone may mean that they were concerned about reducing 
the risk for those with the higher baseline risk instead. In our study, the concern for those most 
at risk could not be disentangled from a general preference for efficiency, as the largest gain 
would always be accrued by those that were initially at a higher risk. However, future work 
involving a formal test of this difference would be a valuable contribution to the literature about 
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Appendix A – Chapter 2 
A.1. Pilot Studies 
The final design of the study was developed after pre-tests done in 4 pilot studies.  
The first one was an online study (n=105) that consisted of the ranking and valuation tasks only. 
The goals of this study were two-fold. First, it was used to find out about the value people placed 
on 30 objects we had pre-selected, in order to select 10 out of them, which would be used in 
the actual study. We wanted the valuations of the final selection of objects to be spread out 
rather than clustered together, but the values of the six objects of interest (the three that had 
some comparable dimensions, and the three that did not) to be approximately at par. We also 
wanted to check the relationship between the monetary valuations and market price (see Table 
18). We found a broad correlation between the two: cheaper items were usually in the bottom 
of respondents’ rankings, and more expensive ones were at the top. However, their ranking 
within these two groups and their monetary valuations did not match market price. This 
indicated that valuations did not exclusively depend on it and suggested that participants were 
introspecting to come up with those values. The second goal of this study was to check that the 
instructions were clear, and the interface was easy to use, for the ranking and the valuation 
tasks. We found no problems with regards to this. 
Table 18. Objects Price in Amazon (July 2015) 
Alarm Clock £4.60 Toaster £18 
Radio Alarm Clock £19 Bottle £10.60 
Radio-speaker Alarm Clock £20 Headphones £33 
Air Mattress £33 Mouse £2.59 
Clicker £8 Suitcase £37 
 
Pilot 2 was run in the lab (n=10) and featured the final 10 objects selection, and the ranking, 
valuation, and lotteries tasks. It was run to test the clarity of the instructions and the ease of 
use of the interface for the whole study. After participants had finished with these tasks on the 
computer, we held two focus groups and asked participants about the instructions and 
interface, and to walk us through the way they completed each of the tasks. Participants agreed 
that the tasks were clear, and the interface was easy to use. Some participants stated that in 
the ranking and valuation tasks, they could not avoid thinking about market price, whereas in 
the gambles, they only considered their preferences. This pointed out the need to modify the 
first part of the design to minimise the influence of market prices on people’s monetary 




ranking, where respondents would be making choices between every possible pair of objects, 
and the objects and some money amounts. This task should also make it easier for participants 
to introspect about their preferences, as instead of building the objects ranking from scratch, 
the computer would infer one from their answers to the binary choices, and they would just 
need to adjust it.  
Pilot 3 was an online study (n=159) aimed to test whether having participants consider money 
amounts in the binary choice questions would induce them to pay additional attention to 
market price, and whether that would override their preferences as a criterion for choice. 
Participants went through the pairwise choice and ranking tasks. Half of them encountered 
objects only, and the other half made decisions involving objects and money amounts. We found 
no significant differences between the objects rankings of participants in the condition where 
they saw questions with objects only, compared to the one where they saw questions that also 
included money amounts. Hence, we concluded that seeing money amounts did not change 
people’s stated preferences about their monetary values for the objects, compared to not 
seeing money amounts. This confirmed that further changes to the study design were not 
necessary.  
Pilot 4 (n=21) was ran to ensure that there were not technical issues with the study before we 
recruited the whole sample of participants. Participants received a show-up fee as 
compensation for their time, but their answers were not incentivised. For that reason, the data 




A.2. Instructions and Interface 
This appendix includes a sample of screenshots of the interface, and instructions for each task 
of the study. 
Figure 19. Welcome 
 
 











Figure 22. Riskless Pairwise Choice Instructions 
 
 



























Figure 28. Detail of Object Information Available throughout the Study 
 
 































Figure 35. Introduction to Risky Pairwise Choice Block 
 






 “Thank you for your answers to far! 
Here are some questions about you, which will help us understand the different ways that 
people make decisions like these. Once you have filled in this information, the session will be 
over. 
Gender: Male / Female 
Age: [open box] 
Highest education level attained: 
- GCSE/O Levels 
- A Levels or equivalent 
- Bachelor’s Degree 
- Master’s Degree 
- PhD 
Currently studying? Yes/No; Subject: [open box] 
Employed: Yes/No; Full Time/Part Time 
Personal monthly income before tax: 
- Up to £1,000 
- £1,001 to £1,500 
- £1,501 to £2,000 
- £2,001 to £3,000 
- £3,001 to £4,000 
- More than £4,000 
Help us improve our survey. Was any aspect of what we asked you to do unclear or overly 
complicated? If there was anything you didn’t like, how could we improve it? If you wrote 













Figure 37. Payment Screens 
 
“The researcher running the session will shortly come to your desk to go through the payment screens 
with you. First, you are going to pick an envelope to determine from which of the blocks the choice that 
will be played out is. Then, the researcher will fill in the block number in the following box and click Next. 
[Example] You have drawn number 3, so one of the choices you made in Block 3 will be played out for 
real. Each question in this block had a number from 1 to 25. Now, you are going to draw a tile from a bag 
to determine which of them will be played out for real, and the researcher will fill in the question number 
in the following box and click Next. 
Question 15 in block 3 was the following and you chose A. Your payment is the Toaster. Go to the part of 
the lab where the objects are and bring the paper slip with you, and another researcher will give you your 




A.3. Probability Trees 
 
Figure 38. Probability Tree – Starting Probability = 0.50 





















A.4. Risky Pairwise Choice Randomisation 
Types of Questions 
The risky pairwise choice questions in this study can be classified in 6 categories: 
- X: Questions of interest for Chapter 2 
- CR: Questions of interest for Chapter 3 
- A: Attention checks 
- M: Modified standard gamble questions 
- B: Bound distance manipulation questions 
- R: Repeated questions 
More information about questions X and CR can be found in their respective chapters, and about 
the attention check questions, in Appendix A.5. 
Modified Standard Gamble Questions (M) 
These questions differ from the gamble scenarios in Chapter 2 in that they do not have a riskless 
prospect. See example in Table 19. The formerly ‘sure’ prospect has been modified by adding a 
5% risk of the worst outcome. This modification was used by Carty et al. (1999) when valuing 
health in order to avoid participants choosing the ‘sure’ prospect driven by their desire to avoid 
risk rather than by their preferences over the health states. These questions were included in 
this study to test the extent of this effect with non-health goods; that is to see how much the 
percentage of ‘sure’ prospect choices decreased when a small possibility of receiving the worst 
outcome was added to the prospect. These results are not relevant for this thesis but are 
available upon request. 





The gamble scenarios that were presented with and without the modification were scenarios P 
and Q with dissimilar objects. Here, these are labelled using the shortening Mp and Mq 
respectively, followed by a number (1 to 5) for the iteration. Some of these questions (Mp1, 
Mp2, Mp3, Mq1 and Mq2) always appeared in the same order for all participants, but the rest 
(Mp4, Mq3, Mq4, and Mp5 and Mq5 if the iterations had not finished after 4 questions) would 
not always be presented to participants.  
Bound distance manipulation questions (B) 
These questions were included in the study to test the hypothesis that the distance between 
the new bound and the bound they substituted (here, the worst object and receiving nothing) 
may have an effect on the direction of the disparity between the direct and indirect SG estimate. 
This was tested by using the same original bounds, but manipulating the distance between the 
new bound and the old bound.  
The questions used to test this had different payoffs A, B and C than the questions in Chapter 2. 
Based on each participant’s valuations, a ranking of preference for the objects was established. 
The best (A) and second best (B) payoffs were the 1st and 4th in the ranking. Payoff C, the worst 
object and new bound, was varied across ‘conditions’ or questions. In one question it was the 
10th object (so that the distance between the new bound and the old bound, receiving nothing, 
was the lowest possible); in the other question, it was the 7th object (so that the distance was 
higher). 
Table 20 includes the questions required to answer our research question. The first gamble 
scenario, which corresponds to scenario P, is the same for both questions: we call it Bpi, where 
i corresponds to the question number. Scenarios Q and R vary in the worst and the best payoffs 
respectively, so in order to differentiate them, we include the question number in their name 
(for example, B1qi and B2qi). The following questions appeared in a fixed order: Bp1-3, B1q1-3, 
B2q1-2, B1r1-3. After these, the order in which they would appear is: B2q3, Bp4, B1q4, B1r4, 
B2q4, and if the iterations had not finished, Bp5, B1q5, B1r5, B2q5. Due to an error in data 
collection, the gamble scenario B2Ri was not presented to participants. Hence, these questions 
could not be used to answer the intended question.  
Table 20. Bound Distance Manipulation Gamble Scenarios 
n Bpi Bnqi Bnri 
1 Object #4 
 
 




Object #10 Nothing 









Some participants valued one or more of the similar or dissimilar objects above £50. In the 
money equivalent gamble scenarios, instead of having their own object valuations, they were 
shown questions with the following pre-set amounts: 
- Money Equivalent of Similar Objects: £10.75 for certain vs. £2 or £17.50 
- Money Equivalent of Dissimilar Objects: £8.75 for certain vs. £5.25 or £19.50 
- Common Ratio Effect: £9 for certain vs. £0 or £12 (note that the ¾ ratio is maintained) 
Question Randomisation 
The order of the questions is as shown in Table 21, where every row corresponds to a round. 
Rounds were not made explicit to participants, who completed four blocks of 25 questions each. 
In every round, one iteration of the questions of interest for Chapter 2 was completed – 
remember that these iterations could take 4 or 5 questions.  
The first round includes 24 questions; the questions of interest for Chapter 2 and the rest were 
alternated. In subsequent rounds, there was only one of the other questions for every three of 
interest for Chapter 2. In the last two, there are several questions per cell, indicating that there 
were several options which would be presented in the order that they appear in the cell. For 
example, consider question 10 of round V. The first option was the fifth iteration of one of the 
Chapter 2 gamble scenarios (X5). If the iteration had finished in 4 rounds, then the question 
presented would be a modified standard gamble question (M). If the iteration of the modified 
scenario had finished too, a random Chapter 2 question would be repeated (R). 
In every round, the order of Chapter 2 questions was randomised. These questions are identified 
using an X and a number that corresponds to their iteration. There were 10 common ratio effect 
(CR) questions, which were all presented in random order, and hence labelled just using CR. 
There were 4 attention check questions, identified as A1 (the first one) and then simply A (to 
indicate that it could be any of the remaining 3). There were up to 10 modified standard gamble 
questions (M), if both iterations took 5 questions. With regards to the bound distance 
manipulation questions (B), up to 20 of them were presented. 
Starting Probability Randomisation 
Each participant’s Chapter 2 gamble scenarios were randomly allocated to one of the white 
round 1 cells (see Table 21). Each of these cells had a probability associated to them, which had 
been selected to add variety to the first round. These were the probabilities at which each 









Table 21. Question Randomisation 
Round / Question 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
I X1 Bp1 X1 B1q1 X1 CR X1 B1r1 X1 Mp1 X1 CR X1 B2q1 X1 Bp2 X1 CR X1 Mq1 X1 B1q2 X1 CR 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
II X2 X2 X2 B1q2 X2 X2 X2 CR X2 X2 X2 Mp2 X2 X2 X2 CR 
III X3 X3 X3 B2q2 X3 X3 X3 Mq2 X3 X3 X3 A1 X3 X3 X3 Rp3  
IV X4 X4 X4 CR X4 X4 X4 B1q3 X4 X4 X4 Mp3 X4 X4 X4 R1r3 
V X5 / B X5 / M X5 / B M X5 / B X5 / M X5 / B B X5 / A X5 /M /R X5 / B/ R CR X5 / B / R X5 / M / R X5 / A CR 
 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  10 11 12  










Round I Qn.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 






A.5. Attention Checks 
Two sets of two attention checks questions each were built into our design (see Table 23).  
Table 23. Attention Check Questions 
1 
Alarm Clock, p=0.50 Radio-speaker Alarm Clock, p=0.55 
Nothing, p=0.50 Nothing, p=0.45 
2 Radio-speaker Alarm Clock, p=1 
Alarm Clock, p=0.95 
Nothing, p=0.05 
3 Bottle, p=1 
Suitcase, p=0 
Nothing, p=1 
4 Bottle, p=1 
Radio-speaker alarm clock, p=0 
Nothing, p=1 
 
The first one featured the similar objects and also has “nothing” as a possible outcome. For 
participants that ranked the alarm clocks in the expected order (radio-speaker alarm clock ≻ 
radio alarm clock ≻ alarm clock), the rational, (expected) utility maximising answer would be to 
choose the right side on gamble 1a, and left side on 1b. These sides correspond to the gambles 
as depicted on the table above, but in the study, they were assigned to the right or left side 
randomly. For those that did not rank the clocks in that order, they should choose the left side 
on 1a as long as the following is true  
𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘)  <  (
0.50
0.55
) · 𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘)   (8) 
and right side on 1b as long as 
𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑜 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘)  <  0.95 · 𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘).   (9) 
One participant did not answer question 1a as a rational participant would have, but the rest of 
participants did. This participant only failed 1 out of 4 attention checks so we do not consider 
necessary to exclude her answers from the analysis.  
Gambles on the second set offered an object that was generally viewed as relatively bad for 
certain, and a very good one with probability 0, and nothing with probability 1 on the other side. 
If participants chose the left side, then we know that they were not disregarding probabilities 
and paying attention to the items only, even in cases when the difference in value of the objects 
was large. There was only one participant that failed this attention check, and because this did 
only happen in one out of their four questions, we did not consider necessary to exclude their 






Table 24. Self-Reported Measures about the Objects: Desire to Receive Them 
Object 
DESIRE  
(0=not at all, 6=very much) 
Median Mean SD 
Headphones 4 4.02 1.96 
Radio-speaker Alarm Clock 4 3.53 2.10 
Suitcase 3 3.12 2.27 
Radio Alarm Clock 3 2.88 2.15 
Air Mattress 3 2.83 2.17 
Mouse 2 2.10 2.07 
Alarm Clock 1 1.81 1.89 
Bottle 1 1.64 1.65 
Toaster 1 1.62 1.89 
Clicker 1 1.50 1.84 
Note: Objects ordered in decreasing order according to the median desire. 
 
Table 25. Self-Reported Measures about the Objects: Already Own Them 
Object 
ALREADY OWN THEM 
No Yes 
Clicker 52 6 
Air Mattress 46 12 
Radio-speaker Alarm Clock 43 15 
Radio Alarm Clock 40 18 
Alarm Clock 26 32 
Headphones 26 32 
Toaster 26 32 
Mouse 19 39 
Bottle 18 40 
Suitcase 10 48 










A.6. Additional Results 
 
Table 26. Self-Reported Measures about the Objects: Desire to Receive Them 
Object 
DESIRE  
(0=not at all, 6=very much) 
Median Mean SD 
Headphones 4 4.02 1.96 
Radio-speaker Alarm Clock 4 3.53 2.10 
Suitcase 3 3.12 2.27 
Radio Alarm Clock 3 2.88 2.15 
Air Mattress 3 2.83 2.17 
Mouse 2 2.10 2.07 
Alarm Clock 1 1.81 1.89 
Bottle 1 1.64 1.65 
Toaster 1 1.62 1.89 
Clicker 1 1.50 1.84 
Note: Objects ordered in decreasing order according to the median desire. 
 
Table 27. Self-Reported Measures about the Objects: Already Own Them 
Object 
ALREADY OWN THEM 
No Yes 
Clicker 52 6 
Air Mattress 46 12 
Radio-speaker Alarm Clock 43 15 
Radio Alarm Clock 40 18 
Alarm Clock 26 32 
Headphones 26 32 
Toaster 26 32 
Mouse 19 39 
Bottle 18 40 
Suitcase 10 48 










Table 28. OLS Regression Output: Randomised Design Features 
Dependent variable: Indifference Probability  
Independent variables: Coefficients 
  
Starting probability 50 -1.029 
 (2.486) 
Starting probability 65 -0.948 
 (2.507) 
Certain colour pink 0.269 
 (1.809) 
Certain colour purple 1.691 
 (1.930) 
Risky better colour pink -1.188 
 (1.818) 
Risky better colour purple -0.551 
 (1.742) 
Risky worse colour pink - 
  
Risky worse colour purple - 
  







Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 
● The reference categories were starting probability of 35, turquoise colour, and risky option 
displayed on the left-hand side.  
● “Certain colour” refers to the balls in the alternative where the participant would get the 
payoff for sure, and “risky” refers to the ones used in the one where they could either get 
the best or the worst payoffs.  
● The “risky worse colour” variables were omitted. They capture the colour of the balls that 
was used to represent the worse outcome in the risky alternative of the gamble. The 
colours of the best and worst options were automatically generated by an algorithm that 
followed a systematic sequence, and so the colours for the worst payoff do not add 
variance on top of that added by the colours of the best payoff.  
                                                 











































Effect of Differences in Outcome Value on Disparities 
In order to explore this, we classified estimates in two groups only, ‘consistent’ and 
‘inconsistent’. There are two metrics that capture the value difference between the three 
payoffs in each set. First, the value range: the difference between the value of the best and 
worst objects (or their money equivalent). And second, the value of the best payoff, which is 
the only outcome that is common to the three gambles in each set. Table 30 includes summary 
statistics of these values for the consistent and the inconsistent cases. We used two-tailed 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to check whether there was a significant difference between the 
outcomes value differences of the consistent and the inconsistent cases. The p-values from 
these tests can also be found on Table 30.  
Table 30. Mean (SD) of Value Difference metrics by Type of Object (£) 
 
VALUE RANGE                           
(BEST – WORST) (n=58) 
 











































.3724 .0334 .5912  .3863 .0563 .3650 
Because we ran 3 tests for each value metric, we applied the Holm-Bonferroni multiple testing 
correction (Holm, 1979). This correction adjusts the significance level alpha to account for the 
number of tests performed, using less stringent criteria for each test as the p-values increase. 
The more conservative test is hence the one for the lowest p-value (.0334 in this case): the 
former threshold 𝛼  = .05 was divided by 3 (which is the number of tests performed), and 
became .017. We could not reject the null hypothesis of equality of the similar objects value 
range between the consistent and inconsistent cases. In the remaining tests, the p-values were 
already above .05, so reducing the significance level below .05 would not have changed the 







Appendix B – Chapter 3 
 
Table 31. Object Valuations and Comparison of the Value Difference (£) (n=60) 
  Median Mean SD 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test p-value 
Ha: Distance similar objects ≠ 
Distance dissimilar objects 
Similar Objects 
Better 15.00 15.92 12.42 
.4092 
Worse 8.38 11.81 11.03 
Difference 2.50a 4.12 4.55 
Dissimilar Objects 
Better 9.50 13.56 11.89 
Worse  7.25 10.30 9.08 
Difference 2.25 3.26 2.87 
a Note that this is the median of the value difference, not the difference of the medians 
 
 
Table 32. Comparison of the Deviation from Target Ratio (n=60) 
  Median Mean SD 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test p-value 
Ha: Deviation similar objects ≠ 
Deviation dissimilar objects 
Similar Objects -0.0114 -0.0210 0.1640 
.4512 
Dissimilar Objects 0 0.0077 0.0317 
 
 
Table 33. Confidence (‘sureness’) in Preference by Similarity (n = 60) 
  Dissimilar Goods  
  Unsure Sure TOTAL 
Similar 
Goods 
Unsure 7 3 10 
Sure 17 33 50 
 TOTAL 24 36 60 










Appendix C – Chapter 4 
C.1. Instructions 
Figure 41 and Table 34 show how the bacteria and the policy options were presented to 
participants across conditions. The text in blue was only shown to those participants in the self-
interest condition. The text in red corresponds to the alternative versions for the death and the 
gastroenteritis conditions. 
 
Figure 41. Instructions: Bacteria Introduction & Policy Options Rating 
 
Imagine a city with a population of 200,000 people. Half the population live in the East 
Zone and the other half in the West Zone. You live in the East Zone. 
 
These zones are serviced by water supplies from two different reservoirs. These 
reservoirs are currently contaminated with three different types of bacteria. These 
bacteria are harmful and if nothing is done about them they are expected to kill / give 
gastroenteritis to 46 people over the next 10 years. 
 
Gastroenteritis caused by these bacteria is not contagious between people and it 
cannot kill you, but people infected will have the following symptoms for 
approximately two weeks: 
- Watery diarrhea 
- Abdominal cramps and pain 
- Nausea, vomiting, or both 
- Occasional muscle aches or headache 
- Low-grade fever. 
  
o Bacteria E is affecting the reservoir which supplies the people who live in the 
East Zone (like you do). It is expected to kill / infect 10 people who live in the 
East Zone. 
o Bacteria W is affecting the reservoir which supplies the people who live in the 
West Zone. It is expected to kill / infect 20 people who live in the West Zone. 
o Bacteria B is affecting both reservoirs. It is expected to kill / infect 16 people - 
8 who live in the East Zone and 8 who live in the West Zone. 
 
The risk of dying /getting gastroenteritis from the three bacteria in the water supply is 
therefore 18 in 100,000 for those who live in the East Zone (like you do) and 28 in 
100,000 for those who live in the West Zone. 
 
However, treating the bacteria in the reservoirs is very expensive and due to cost 
constraints the local government must decide between four water treatment options. 
 
Please, rate each option on a scale from very poor to very good. 














Bacteria B can be eliminated from the water supply in the East Zone and the 
West Zone. 16 people’s lives would therefore be saved / 16 fewer people 
will have gastroenteritis over the next 10 years – 8 lives / people from each 
zone. This means that those who live in the East Zone (like you do) would 
have their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis from the bacteria in the 
water supply reduced from 18 in 100,000 to 10 in 100,000. Those who live in 
the West Zone would have their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis from 




Bacteria E can be eliminated from the water supply in the East Zone. 10 
people’s lives would therefore be saved / 10 fewer people will have 
gastroenteritis over the next 10 years – all from the East Zone. This means 
that those who live in the East Zone (like you do) would have their risk of 
dying / getting gastroenteritis from the bacteria in the water supply reduced 
from 18 in 100,000 to 8 in 100,000. No one who lives in the West Zone 
would benefit from this option – their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis 
from the bacteria in the water supply would be unchanged at 28 in 100,000. 
Policy 
W 
Bacteria W can be eliminated from the water supply in the West Zone. 20 
people’s lives would therefore be saved / 20 fewer people will have 
gastroenteritis over the next 10 years – all from the West Zone. This means 
that those who live in the West Zone would have their risk of dying from the 
bacteria in the water supply reduced from 28 in 100,000 to 8 in 100,000. No 
one who lives in the East Zone (like you do) would benefit from this option – 
your/ their risk of dying from the bacteria in the water supply would be 
unchanged at 18 in 100,000. 
Policy 
X 
All three bacteria which affect the water supplies in the East Zone and West 
Zone can be treated. Although the bacteria would not be completely 
eliminated by this treatment, 7 people’s lives will be saved / fewer people 
will have gastroenteritis over the next 10 years – 3 lives / people from the 
East Zone and 4 lives / people from the West Zone. This means that those 
who live in the East Zone (like you do) would have their risk of dying / 
getting gastroenteritis from the bacteria in the water supply reduced from 
18 in 100,000 to 15 in 100,000. Those who live in the West Zone would have 
their risk of dying / getting gastroenteritis from the bacteria in the water 








C.2. Variable Specification 
 
Table 35. Main Effects of Choice Scenario: Values 
Choice 
MAIN EFFECTS OF CHOICE SCENARIO 
   
‘Efficiency’ ‘Equity’ ‘Benefit East’ 
B vs. W 4 -8 -20 
E vs. W 10 -10 -10 
X vs. W 13 -3 -19 
E vs. B 6 -2 10 
X vs. B 9 5 1 
X vs. E 3 7 -9 
 
 
